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Associational Structures of Religious 
Organizations 
Patty Gerstenblith* 
A legal structure is the organizational framework within 
which the law permits business to be conducted. Over the past 
four centuries, religious organizations have used various 
structures to gain legal recognition, status, and rights, 
particularly the right to acquire and to hold property. During 
the colonial era, the colonists borrowed extensively from 
English law in all areas, including the treatment of religious 
societies. Guided by the prevailing English method of the time, 
most of the colonies (and subsequently the states) provided 
legal status and certain rights to religious organizations, as to 
business corporations, by the granting of special charters. 
The purpose of a special charter was to create a 
corporation for a particular purpose and to assure certain 
rights or powers. A special charter required an act of the 
sovereign or legislature. Just as the Crown and the Parliament 
in England held the power to approve or deny the creation of a 
corporation, the states similarly continued to maintain the 
special charter system to which both ecclesiastical and lay 
corporations were subject. However, abuses inherent in the 
special charter system, including favoritism and obstruction of 
the work of legislatures because of the numerous demands for 
such charters, became apparent during the nineteenth century, 
and states therefore gradually replaced the special charter 
system with general incorporation statutes. These general 
incorporation statutes included within their scope a variety of 
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charitable and not-for-profit corporations, including religious 
organizations.' 
Despite the inherent differences in the natures of not-for- 
profit and business corporations, state statutes for not-for-profit 
corporations often mirror the state statutes for general for- 
profit business corporations. This similarity may lie in the fact 
that in the development of American statutory law, business 
corporations received more attention from legislatures, 
progressed more rapidly, and were of greater concern to the 
legal and business communities than  not-for-profit 
 corporation^.^ For example, the study and preparation of 
model acts for business corporations preceded the drafting of a 
model act for not-for-profit corporations, and the drafters of the 
Model Non-Profit Corporation Act clearly borrowed heavily 
from the previously published model and actual business 
corporation  statute^.^ A second reason for the apparent 
similarity may be that the same attorneys, coming fkom 
corporate business backgrounds, tend to draft both types of 
 statute^.^ This influence may be seen in those states which use 
1. Paul G. Kauper & Stephen C. Ellis, Religious Corporations and the Law, 
71 MICH. L. REV. 1499, 1507 (1973). 
2. Louis P. Haller, The Model Non-Profit Corporation Act, 9 BAYLOR L. REV. 
309, 316 (1957). 
3. The Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the 
Uniform Business Corporation Act in 1928 after nearly twenty years of study, 
while the Model Business Corporation Act was published in its initial form in 
1946. Id. a t  315. On the other hand, the original draft of the Model Non-Profit 
Corporation Act was not published until 1952 and was subsequently revised in 
1957, 1964, and 1987. Id. at  320; Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit 
Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 528 (1981). 
4. Almost all members of the American Bar Association committees that 
draR or amend model not-for-profit corporation acts have been corporate business 
attorneys, although it is possible that, as the number of not-for-profit organizations 
expands, this may change. HOWARD L. OLECK, NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND ASSOCIATIONS 61 (5th ed. 1988). The approach taken by these 
drafters may be skewed by their business backgrounds. Hansmann, supra note 3, 
a t  528. Oleck criticizes the validity of such an approach by business lawyers. 
Instead, Oleck contends that the drafters should include "philosophers, 
anthropologists, biologists, statisticians and demographers, theologians, sociologists, 
economists, psychologists, and the like, plus a few lawyers to crystallize the 
principles enunciated by the committee into workable rules of law." OLECK, supra, 
a t  61. 
However, another commentator suggests a possible argument to support the 
business-oriented approach. Not-for-profit corporation acts which resemble business 
corporation acts will be easier to use and apply by lawyers who are already 
familiar with the procedures of the more widely used business corporation acts and 
with the case law that has developed construing them. Thus, any knowledge of or 
expertise in the business law area would conceivably help a lawyer work with and 
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a single act to govern both business and not-for-profit 
corporations, even though particular provisions may apply to 
only one type of ~orporation.~ 
State law is the primary source for the formation, 
structure, operation, legal rights and duties, non-tax 
regulation, and dissolution of  organization^.^ Under the 
different state statutes,' the current legal structures available 
to religious organizations include the charitable trust, the 
unincorporated association, the corporation sole, religious 
corporations, and not-for-profit corporations. However, not all 
of these legal structures are available in every state. According 
to the recently completed Survey of Regional and National 
Religious Organizations, conducted by the DePaul University 
Center for ChurchIState Studies, the surveyed organizations 
adopted each of these available structural forms in the 
following proportions: 8% use the form of an unincorporated 
association; 3% use the general not-for-profit corporation; 87% 
understand a similarly constructed not-for-profit corporation law. Haller, supra note 
2, at 320. 
5. For example, the not-for-profit corporation laws of Delaware, Kansas, and 
Oklahoma are embedded in each state's general corporation law. DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, $4 101-398 (1991 & Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. $8 17-6001 to -7404 
(1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, $8 1001-1143 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992). 
6. Two "levels* or sources of law-the federal government and the 50 state 
governments-regulate business, as well as nonbusiness organizations. As applied 
to not-for-profit organizations, including charitable organizations, this is significant 
because different aspects of formation, benefits or favorable treatment, and 
regulation arise variously from state or federal law. Perhaps the most characteristic 
feature of not-for-profit organizations is their tax-exempt status and, in the case of 
charitable organizations, the deductibility of donations for federal income tax 
purposes of the donor. These benefits arise from federal income tax law and are 
mirrored, with some variations, in comparable tax benefits at  the state level-for 
example, exemption from state corporate income tax, property taxes and state sales 
tax. The federal Internal Revenue Service is the primary means of preventing 
abuses and restricting certain types of activities in which such organizations may 
engageprimarily political activity, such as campaigning and lobbying, and 
unrelated business activities. I.R.C. $5 501(c)(3), 170 (1994). 
7. An organization which wishes to obtain various legal rights or privileges, 
such as federal tax-exempt status, would likely choose to receive a legal status 
under state law first. However, in the United States, unlike many other nations, it 
is not necessary for legal status to be acquired or for religious organizations to 
register in any form before they are able to operate. Many religious organizations 
in the United States have the status of an unincorporated association or charitable 
trust, for which no registration or incorporation is required. The purpose of the 
legal formalities is only to confer certain specific legal benefits on religious 
organizations and' to facilitate the achieving of certain other benefits, such as tax- 
exempt status, although incorporation is by no means necessary to achieving tax- 
exempt status. 
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use the religious not-for-profit corporation form; and 1% each 
use the charitable or religious trust, a corporation sole, a for- 
profit corporation, or "some other type of legal stru~ture."~ It is 
likely that the 87% that indicated use of the religious not-for- 
profit corporate form encompasses both the specific religious 
corporation form and the not-for-profit corporation organized 
for religious purposes. These results are not necessarily 
indicative of the distribution of structural forms which would 
be found at the local level where, although the religious 
corporation form might still prevail, some of the other forms, 
particularly the unincorporated association, may appear more 
frequently. 
The primary characteristic (and the one necessary to 
receive advantageous tax status) of not-for-profit organizations 
is the "nondistribution ~onstraint."~ This means that the 
members, officers and directors of the organization do not 
receive any profit from the activities of the organization. A 
"not-for-profit" organization may, in fact, earn a profit; it 
simply cannot distribute that profit to its membership but 
must, instead, utilize that "profit" in furthering its not-for- 
profit purpose.1° Most state statutes grant an exception to this 
nondistribution constraint so that "reasonable compensation 
[can be paid] to members, directors and officers for services 
rendered."ll 
In addition to being characterized by the non-distribution 
constraint, most not-for-profit organizations may be categorized 
as falling into one of two groups-the "mutual" benefit 
organizations and the "public" benefit organizations. The latter 
8. Judith A. Schejbal, with Paul Lavrakas and John P.N. Massad, 1994 
Report on the Survey of Religious Organizations at  the National Level 13, DEPAUL 
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW CENTER FOR CHURCHBTATE STUDIES. 
9. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 
838 (1980). 
10. State statutes may define a not-for-profit corporation as "a corporation no 
part of the income or profit of which is distributable to its members, directors or 
officers." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, 5 2302(3) (1993); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
Q 450.2108(2) (West Supp. 1994) (defining a not-for-profit corporation as a 
corporation "incorporated to carry out any lawful purpose or purposes not involving 
pecuniary profit or gain for its directors, officers, shareholders, or members"). The 
nondistribution constraint is embodied in Internal Revenue Code 5 501(c)(3) (1994). 
11. Christine Chute, Comment, Personal Liability for Directors of Nonprofit 
Corporations in Wyoming, 18 LAM> & WATER L. REV. 273, 276-77 (1983). Other 
forms of nonpecuniary benefits, particularly status and prestige, may inure to 
officers and directors of not-for-profit organizations and are generally considered 
permissible. 
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is largely synonymous with the general category of "charitable" 
organizations; they receive significantly more advantageous tax 
treatment at the federal and generally also state levels and 
usually have a religious, educational, or eleemosynary 
purpose.12 Charitable organizations also have stricter 
regulation of their activities and their .dissolution processes, 
and some state laws define the category more narrowly than 
does federal tax law.13 The mutual benefit category may 
include social clubs and trade associations; they have fewer tax 
advantages but also less strict regulation, and some states 
permit the distribution of these organizations' assets to their 
membership upon dissolution. Because virtually all religious 
organizations would fall into the category of public benefit or 
charitable not-for-profit organization, this paper will focus 
exclusively on this not-for-profit form." 
This article will first present an explanation of the various 
associational structures made available to religious 
organizations under state law, including the unincorporated 
association, charitable trust, not-for-profit corporation, religious 
corporation, specific denominational corporation, and finally 
corporation sole. While some of these structures are available 
to a wide variety of associations, some are specifically limited 
to religious organizations and some are even further limited to 
particular religious denominations. At the conclusion of this 
section, the article considers the questions of whether a 
particular religious group can choose its structural form when 
the state makes more than one form available, and whether a 
religious group can organize in a state which offers an 
advantageous structural form but then function in a different 
state. The second section considers some of the implications for 
12. I.R.C. $ 501(c)(3) (1994). 
13. See UTAH CODE ANN. 5 16-6-63 (Michie 1991); Utah County v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265, 267 (Utah 1985) (holding that, 
although a property owner is a nonprofit corporation, it is not exempt from 
property tax under state constitution requiring property to be used exclusively for 
religious or charitable purposes). Revised regulations, which ensured that the 
required "element of gift to the community" would be satisfied to qualify as a 
c h ~ t a b l e  purpose, were upheld. Howell v. County Bd. ex rel. IHC Hosps., Inc., 
881 P.2d 880, 884-85 (Utah 1994). 
14. In tax code terminology, most religious organizations would qualify as 
§ 501(c)(3) organizations as long as they conform with the other requirements of 
$ 501(c)(3). The typologies used by state statutes vary considerably, however. In 
one prominent example, California uses a tripartite classification of mutual benefit, 
public benefit, and religious organizations, thus treating religious organizations as a 
distinct type of not-for-profit organization. 
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Free Exercise claims which can be brought by religious 
organizations in light of these structural choices and recent 
developments in constitutional jurisprudence. 
11. STRUCTURAL FORMS OF RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 
This section will briefly examine the charitable trust and 
the unincorporated association and then focus on the three 
forms of corporations available to religious organizations: the 
not-for-profit corporation, the religious corporation, and the 
corporation sole. 
A. Unincorporated Association and Charitable Trust 
The least formal of the organizational structures available 
to religious groups are the unincorporated association and the 
charitable trust. While these structures have the advantage of 
simplicity in their formation, they also have several major 
disadvantages under the laws of most states. These disadvan- 
tages include lack of limits on personal liability for the mem- 
bers and directors; difficulties in the ownership, receipt and 
succession of property, particularly real property; complications 
in entering into legal transactions such as contracts and the 
initiation of lawsuits; and, for trusts, regulation of the trustees 
by very strict principles of fiduciary duty. 
For these reasons, most organizations which are of any size 
or complexity, which own property, or which desire to gain 
other advantages from a more formal corporate status choose to 
incorporate under one of the applicable state incorporation stat- 
utes. Even those organizations which operate at  the regional or 
national level and thus across state lines must incorporate in 
one state, and the law of that state will generally determine 
any questions involving legal status. 
In many states, a religious organization would still have a 
choice of corporate form. While the most prevalent form avail- 
able is the not-for-profit corporation with a religious purpose, 
other available forms include the religious corporation and the 
corporation sole. Each of these forms will be considered. 
B. The Not-for-Profit Corporation with Religious Purpose 
1. Statutory scheme of not-for-profit corporation statutes 
All states have enacted laws to provide for the incorpora- 
tion of not-for-profit organizations; while all of these statutes 
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share certain characteristics, other provisions vary from state 
to state. The common significant elements include the require- 
ment of a purpose clause, a procedure to incorporate, an enu- 
meration of general powers, a method for merger and consoli- 
dation, and a provision for distribution of assets upon dissolu- 
tion. Some of the characteristics of those elements which are 
distinctive to not-for-profit organizations and religious organi- 
zations in particular will be briefly considered.15 
The purpose clause of a state statute determines the pur- 
poses for which an organization may be formed as a not-for- 
profit corporation. Throughout the states, two types of statuto- 
ry provisions prevail. The first type of statute specifically re- 
stricts the purposes for which not-for-profit corporations may 
be formed by enumerating a lengthy list of permissible purpos- 
es, which generally includes a religious purpose? The second 
type of purpose clause simply states that a not-for-profit corpo- 
ration may be formed for any lawful purpose or purposes and 
does not include a detailed list of permissible purposes." The 
15. The procedures for incorporation of religious organizations under the gen- 
eral not-for-profit corporation statutes do not raise any issues particular to religious 
organizations. State statutes generally require one or more individuals to act as 
incorporators who sign the articles of incorporation, which include basic information 
concerning the corporation-particularly, the purpose for which the corporation ex- 
ists-and file them in the office of the secretary of state. Corporate existence usu- 
ally becomes effective on the date of filing, after which the board may adopt by- 
laws (the regulations governing the internal affairs of the corporation), elect offi- 
cers, and transact any other business. 
16. For example, the Illinois statute restricts the permissible purposes for 
which a not-for-profit corporation may be organized to one or more of 30 listed 
acceptable purposes or similar purposes, including charitable, benevolent, eleemosy- 
nary, educational, civic, patriotic, political, religious, social, literary, athletic, scien- 
tific, research, agricultural, soil improvement, crops, livestock, trade and profession- 
al associations, and certain cooperative and condominium associations. ILL. ANN. 
STAT. ch. 805, para. 1051103.05 (1994); see, e.g., People ex rel. Padula v. Hughes, 
16 N.E.2d 922 (Ill. Ct. App. 1938) (holding that incorporation under the not-for- 
profit corporation act permitted only for those associations which organize for one 
of the statutorily enumerated purposes). The states of Virginia and West Virginia 
form exceptions to this discussion in that they do not permit the incorporation of 
religious organizations; they will be considered later in a separate section. 
17. The New Jersey Nonprofit Corporation Act provides an example of a non- 
restrictive purpose clause which nonetheless enumerates specific purposes by way 
of illustration, as follows: 
A corporation may be organized under this act for any lawful purpose 
other than for pecuniary profit including, without being limited to, any 
one or more of the following purposes: charitable; benevolent; eleemosy- 
nary; educational; cemetery; civic; patriotic; political; religious; social; fka- 
ternal; literary; cultural; athletic; scientific; agricultural; horticultural; 
animal husbandry; volunteer fire company; ambulance, first aid or rescue; 
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trend in state statutes seems to be toward adoption of the gen- 
eral purpose clause provisions, particularly as illustrated in the 
current Model Nonprofit Corporation Act. 
The general powers granted to not-for-profit corporations 
are similar to those granted to business  corporation^,'^ with a 
few restrictions to ensure compliance with the nondistribution 
constraint." Some states specifically limit a not-for-profit 
corporation's ability to merge or consolidate with for-profit 
corporations; generally, domestic not-for-profit corporations 
may merge or consolidate with both domestic and foreign corpo- 
rations with similar purposes.20 
When a not-for-profit corporation undergoes either volun- 
tary or involuntary dissolution, its assets must be dealt with 
differently than those of a for-profit corporation. In general, 
assets must first be used to pay creditors. Second, the not-for- 
profit corporation must return to donors those contributions 
which were received and held upon the condition that they 
would be returned upon dissolution of the corporation. Third, 
assets must be transferred to another corporation engaged in 
substantially similar activities if the assets were received and 
held by the corporation subject to limitations permitting their 
use only for a particular purpose including charitable, religious, 
eleemosynary, benevolent or other similar purposes. Finally, in 
professional, commercial, industrial or trade association; and labor union 
and cooperative purposes. 
N. J. STAT. ANN. 5 15A:2-l(a) West 1984). 
The difference among states in permissible purposes is not particularly signifi- 
cant for religious organizations, because religion is generally considered a permissi- 
ble purpose. However, the difference does represent a philosophical dispute as to 
whether not-for-profit organizations must merely conform to the nondistribution 
constraint or whether they must be further restricted to particular categories of 
purposes considered beneficial to society. This disagreement is epitomized in the 
work of Hansmann and Oleck. See, e.g., OLECK, supra note 4, at 57-100; 
Hansmann, supra note 3, at  509-37. 
18. Such powers typically include the right to perpetual succession, the ability 
to own and deal with real and personal property, the right to sue and be sued, 
the right to borrow and lend money, the right to enter into contracts, the ability 
to indemnify its officers and directors, and the ability to enact bylaws. See, e.g., 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, 5 2352 (1993); see also Pilgrim Evangelical Lutheran 
Church of Unaltered Augsburgh Confession v. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod 
Found., 661 S.W. 833 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that no distinction exists be- 
tween the powers of a not-for-profit and a for-profit corporation). 
19. The most typical distinctions concern the restrictions on the ability to 
compensate officers and directors, which is generally limited to a "reasonablen 
amount, and restrictions on the ability to make loans to officers and directors. 
20. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. gg 15A:lO-1, -2, -7 (West 1984). 
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the case of mutual benefit organizations, assets are to be dis- 
tributed to members or other persons as required by the ar- 
ticles of incorporation or bylaws. Thus, the assets of a dissolv- 
ing not-for-profit corporation are typically distributed, in order, 
to creditors, to contributors who have conditioned their gifts, to 
another corporation with similar purposes, and to members or  
other persons when not inconsistent with statutory restrictions. 
Most gifts to a not-for-profit corporation with a religious pur- 
pose would be interpreted as conditioned on use for a similar 
purpose, and therefore, upon dissolution of such a corporation, 
the assets would be given to a corporation with a similar pur- 
pose. 
2. Incorporation under the general not-for-profit corporation 
statute as a specific type 
At least six states and the Revised Model Nonprofit Corpo- 
ration Act of 1987 (RMNCA)21 employ statutory schemes 
whereby an organization is required to incorporate as a specific 
type of not-for-profit corporation under the general not-for- 
profit corporation statute. As previously discussed, most states 
use either a restrictive or nonrestrictive purpose clause. In con- 
trast, these states and the RMNCA distinguish the purposes of 
a not-for-profit corporation by the use of specific categories. The 
purpose of this statutory scheme is to provide a single regulato- 
ry framework for all not-for-profit corporations while also per- 
mitting differences in the treatment of the various types of 
corporations. 
The New York Not-for-Profit Corporation Law (N-PCL)" 
establishes a single supporting statute not only for the different 
types of not-for-profit corporations which can incorporate under 
the general statute, but also for those organizations which can 
incorporate under entirely distinct statutes.23 Organizations 
21. The New York Not-for-Profit Corporation Law of 1970 was the final result 
of a 17-year revision of the state's corporation statutes. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. 
LAW $5 101-1515 (McKinney 1970). California's current Nonprofit Corporation Law 
took effect in 1980. CAL. COW. CODE $$ 5000-10841 (West 1990). The RMNCA was 
adopted in 1987, REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT COW. ACT (1987), and the Tennessee 
Nonprofit Corporation Act became law on January 1, 1988. Wyoming, Arkansas, 
and Florida have more recently adopted the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation 
Act. Much of the following discussion is based on Hansmann, supra note 3, a t  528- 
37, and Harry G. Hem & Jeffery H. Boyd, Statutory Trends in the Law of Non- 
profit Organizations: California, Here We Come!, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1103 (1981). 
22. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW $5 101-1515 (McKinney 1970). 
23. For example, a religious organization can choose to incorporate as either a 
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incorporated under the Type B category of not-for-profit corpo- 
rations, which is equivalent to the public benefit organizations, 
ares subjected to greater judicial supervision than are the mu- 
tual benefit  organization^.^^ 
The California Nonprofit Corporation ~ a w ~ ~  divides not- 
for-profit corporations into three separate classifica- 
tions-public benefit, mutual benefit, and religious corpora- 
tions-and provides a separate set of provisions to regulate 
each ~lassification.~~ As with the New York scheme, the pur- 
pose of these three categories is to allow different degrees of 
regulation of the different types of corporations. However, while 
the public benefit category is subjected to the most extensive 
Type B corporation under the general statute, which category includes charitable, 
educational, religious, scientific, literary, cultural, and prevention of cruelty to chil- 
dren and animals organizations, or under the specific Religious Corporations stat- 
ute, in which case it is subjected to the provisions of the N-PCL as a Type D cor- 
poration and the N-PCL is used as a default provision for any elements which are 
lacking under the Religious Corporations Act. N.Y. RELIG. COW. LAW 5 2-b 
(McKinney Supp. 1990); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT COW. LAW 5 201(c) cmt. (McKinney 
Supp. 1994). 
24. The classification scheme is designed to allow variation in the degree of 
regulation of the different classes of not-for-profit corporations, with the amount of 
regulation determined by the purpose for each classification. See Hansmann, supra 
note 3, at  531; Henn & Boyd, supra note 21, a t  1116. For example, state attorney 
general approval is required for the incorporation of a Type B organization. N.Y. 
NOT-FOR-PROFIT COW. LAW 5 404(a) (McKinney Supp. 1994). Type B corporations 
are subject to inspection visits by the justices of the Supreme Court or their ap- 
pointees, and the court may require the corporation to make an inventory and 
accounting when a member or creditor of the corporation claims that the corpora- 
tion or its directors, officers or agents has engaged in some impermissible activity 
such as misappropriation of funds or property. Id. 5 114. Judicial approval is also 
required for a variety of transactions, including the sale, lease, exchange, or dispos- 
al of all or substantially all of the corporation's assets, id. 5 510(a)(3), merger or 
consolidation, id. 5 907(a), and a plan for distribution of assets upon dissolution of 
the corporation, id. 5 1002(d). 
25. CAL. CORP. CODE $4 5000-10841 (West 1990). 
26. Id. $5 5110-6910 (public benefit corporations); $5 7110-8910 (mutual bene- 
fit corporations); 55 9110-9690 (religious corporations). The California statute takes 
a distinctly different approach than that of New York in that the three categories 
of not-for-profit corporations are each provided a complete and distinct regulatory 
scheme, while the New York statute attempts to integrate the provisions through 
default mechanisms, thereby avoiding repetition. The California scheme has been 
discussed in William T. Fryer, I11 & David R. Haglund, New California Nonprofit 
Corporation Law: A Unique Approach, 7 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1979); Hem & 
Boyd, supra note 21, a t  1133-34; Michael C. Hone, California's New Nonprofit Cor- 
poration Law-An Introduction and Conceptual Background, 13 U.S.F. L. REV. 733, 
736-37 (1979). Hansmann has criticized this trend in both the New York and Cali- 
fornia approaches to create multiple categories of not-for-profit corporations in that 
they add ambiguity and reflect "fundamental confusion concerning the proper role 
and structure for nonprofit organizations." Hansmann, supra note 3, at  538. 
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regulation, the religious corporation category receives the least 
regulation. This varying degree of regulation is best illustrated 
by the s u p e ~ s o r y  role of the state attorney general and the 
disclosure requirements imposed upon the different types of 
 corporation^.^' 
The Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act of 1987~~ is 
similar to the California scheme in that it divides all not-for- 
profit corporations into public benefit, mutual benefit, and reli- 
gious corporations, but it does not provide three separate sets 
of provisions for each of these not-for-profit categories. Howev- 
er, it does follow the California pattern in that i t  establishes a 
tripartite regime of regulation with the public benefit corpora- 
tions receiving the most regulation, the religious corporations 
receiving the least, and mutual benefit corporations occupying 
an intermediate p~sition.~' Tennessee, again, follows a similar 
pattern but recognizes only two categories: mutual and public 
benefit corporations. It thus permits a religious corporation to 
organize as either a mutual or public benefit ~orporation,~' 
but it still subjects religious corporations to the least amount of 
reg~lation.~' 
27. For example, while public benefit corporations are subject to examination 
at  all times by the attorney general, only those assets held subject to a charitable 
trust by mutual benefit corporations are subject to such supervision. However, the 
attorney general has the most limited role in terms of supervising religious corpo- 
rations, presumably to avoid raising First Amendment problems. C&. CORP. CODE 
$8 7140-42, 8510-11, 9230 West 1991); see also Hone, supra note 26, at  743-44. 
Similarly, the disclosure requirements vary in degree according to the type of not- 
for-profit corporation. Public benefit corporations have the most extensive statutory 
requirements for record keeping and reporting; religious corporations have the 
least, and the mutual benefit corporations have an intermediate standard and are 
treated selectively according to size. CAL. COW. CODE $4 6310-24, 9510, 8310-24. 
28. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT COW. ACT (1987). 
29. Id. $5 1.70, 3.04(c), 6.30(f), 7.03(a)(3), 8.31(b)(2), 8.55(d), 11.02(b), 12.02(g), 
14.03. In fact, the RMNCA specifically states that 
[ilf religious doctrine governing the affairs of a religious corporation is 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act on the same subject, the reli- 
gious doctrine shall control to the extent required by the Constitution of 
the United States or the constitution of this state or both. 
Id. 5 1.80. 
30. TENN. CODE ANN. 5 48-51-201(31) (SUPP. 1994). 
31. Sample statutory restrictions placed on public benefit corporations include: 
purchase of memberships prohibited, id. 5 48-56-303; notice to the attorney general 
of derivative suits, id. 5 48-57-103; attorney general initiation of a court-ordered 
meeting, id. 8 48-57-103(a)(1); limitations on mergers, id. $5 48-61-102, -106; notice 
to the attorney general for the sale of assets other than in the regular course of 
activities, id. 5 48-62-102(g); restrictions on voluntary dissolution, id. 5 48-64-103. 
On the other hand, religious corporations are specifically exempted from several 
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C. Corporate Structures Designed Only for Religious Organi- 
zat ions 
Some states permit the incorporation of religious organiza- 
tions in forms other than the not-for-profit corporation. The 
various statutory schemes that pertain only to religious corpo- 
rations include general religious corporation laws, special stat- 
utes for particular denominations, and corporation sole acts. 
1. General religious corporation laws 
Twelve states have statutes designed only for the incorpo- 
ration of religious  organization^:^ while eight additional 
states have distinct incorporation statutes which encompass 
particular types of benevolent, educational, and charitable 
associations, along with religious  organization^.^^ Most of 
these statutes follow a pattern similar to the general not-for- 
profit corporation statutes discussed previously, except- that 
several of them do not include complete sets of provisions for 
handling all corporate matters. In general, however, these 
statutes grant authority and provide procedures for the incor- 
statutory requirements, including those dealing with transfers of memberships, id. 
1) 48-56-202; termination of memberships, id. 8 48-56-302; notice to the attorney 
general of removal of directors by judicial proceeding, id. 1) 48-58-110(d); the gener- 
al prohibition of loans to or guarantees for directors and officers, id. 8 48-58-303; 
and provision for receivership or custodianship in judicial dissolution, id. 1) 48-64- 
303. The Tennessee statute also exempts religious corporations from provisions 
which are inconsistent with religious doctrine, but only to the extent required by 
the federal and state constitutions. Id. 8 48-67-102(b). 
32. Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 1) 33-264 (West 1987); Delaware, 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 27, 1) 101 (1989); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 
110135 (1994); Maine, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, 1) 2861 (1981); Maryland, MD. 
CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS 1) 5-308 (1985); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 67, 1) 22 (West 1988); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 1) 450.159 West 
1990); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. 1) 315.01 (West Supp. 1994); New Jersey, N.J. 
STAT. A m .  4 16:l-2 (West 1984); New York, N.Y. RZLIG. CORP. LAW 1) 2 
(McKinney 1990); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN. 8 187.01 (West Supp. 1988); and 
Wyoming, WYO. STAT. 1) 17-8-103 (1977). 
33. Alabama ("Churches, Public Societies and Graveyard Ownersn), ALA. CODE 
1) 10-4-20 (1987); Colorado ("Religious, Educational, and Benevolent Societiesn), 
COLO. REV. STAT. 8 7-50-101 (1990); District of Columbia ("Charitable, Educational, 
and Religious Associationsn), D.C. CODE ANN. 1) 29-1001 (1981); Kansas ("Religious, 
Charitable and Other Organizationsn), KAN. STAT. ANN. 8 17-1701 (1980); Missouri 
("Religious and Charitable Associationsn), MO. ANN. STAT. 8 352.010 (Vernon 1966); 
Ohio (Tkligious and Benevolent Organizations"), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 1) 1715.01 
(Anderson 1986); Oklahoma ("Religious, Charitable and Educational Corporationsn), 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, 1) 543 (1986); and Wyoming ("Charitable, Educational, Religious 
and Other Societiesn), W O .  STAT. 1) 17-7-101 (1977). 
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poration of any church or religious organizat i~n;~ they delin- 
eate the powers granted to such a corporation, including the 
rights to acquire, hold, and dispose of real and personal proper- 
ty, to borrow money, to have perpetual succession, to sue and 
be sued, and to adopt bylaws for their governan~e.~~ The
statutes may be incomplete in that only a few of them specifjr 
the ability to merge and consolidate with similar corpora- 
t i o n ~ , ~ ~  and even fewer have specific provisions for the disso- 
lution and subsequent distribution of assets of religious corpo- 
r a t i o n ~ . ~ ~  
34. In its Religious Corporations Law, New York distinguishes a religious cor- 
poration from an incorporated church. "A 'Religious Corporations Law corporation' 
is a corporation created for religious purposes . . . ." On the other hand, an incor- 
porated church "is a religious corporation created to enable its members to meet 
for divine worship or other religious observances." N.Y. RELIG. Corn. LAW 8 2 
(McKinney 1990). Some states require that the religious organization consist of a 
certain number of persons before a corporation may be formed. See, e.g., Connecti- 
cut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 8 33-274 (West 1987) (three members); Delaware, DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 27, 8 101 (1989) (15 individuals required); District of Columbia, 
D.C. CODE ANN. 8 29-1001 (1991) (three members); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 67, 8 21 (West 1988) (10 members required); Oklahoma, OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 18, 8 562 (1986) (three members). Some states also set a minimum 
and/or maximum number of trustees (or members of the governing board) of the 
religious corporation. See, e.g., Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 8 450.159 (West 
1990) (Church Trustee Corporations must have a minimum of three and a maxi- 
mum of nine trustees); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. 8 315.01(2) (West Supp. 1990) 
(maximum of fifteen trustees). 
35. The list of specific powers may be brief, see, e.g., Minnesota, MINN. STAT. 
ANN. 8 315.09 (West Supp. 1994), or lengthy, see, e.g., New Jersey, N.J. STAT. 
ANN. 8 16:l-4 (West 1984). 
36. Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. 8 315.365 (West Supp. 1994) (merger of 
religious corporations); Missouri, MO. ANN. STAT. $8 352.140-.I70 (Vernon 1991) 
(benevolent corporations, including religious corporations, may be merged); New 
Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. 88 16:l-20 to -21 (West 1984) (consolidation procedure and 
effect); New York, N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW 8 13 (McKinney Supp. 1990) (consolida- 
tion of incorporated churches); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. $8 1715.08, .21 (Ander- 
son 1992) (consolidation of churches having same form of faith and consolidation 
with corporation created by representative body); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN. 
8 187.14 (West 1992) (consolidation of church corporations or congregations "of the 
same church, sect, denomination or ecclesiastical connection"). 
37. See, e.g., Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. 8 7-50-114 (1990); Connecticut, 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 98 33-264e, 33-264f (West 1987); Missouri, MO. ANN. STAT. 
45 352.180-.240 (Vernon 1991); New York, N.Y. RELIG. Corn. LAW 8 18 (McKinney 
1990). Two states specifically provide for dissolution of a religious society, one by 
the superior body in which the assets will vest if the society dissolves, M M .  STAT. 
ANN. $8 315.37, .38 (West Supp. 1994), and the other upon petition by the govern- 
ing body if i t  is a separately incorporated ecclesiastical body, N.Y. RELIG. CORP. 
LAW 8 18. Upon dissolution and after payment of debts, the assets of the religious 
corporation may revert to those persons who gave or contributed the assets, D.C. 
CODE ANN. 5 29-911 (1991), or they may belong to a superior ecclesiastical body or 
to another organization with similar purposes, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 8 33-264e, 
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2. Denominational statutes 
Fifteen38 states include special statutory provisions for 
particular religious denominations3' which thus enable partic- 
ular religious groups that belong to one of these denominations 
to match their religious precepts and legal requirements far 
more closely than may be possible in the absence of such an ac- 
commodation. Several reasons have been advanced to explain 
the existence of the special statutes to particular denomina- 
tions. First, these statutes may be viewed as a continuation of 
the special charter system, in which the state authorized legal 
status to particular churches through the grant of a special 
charter." Second, special incorporation statutes for particular 
religious denominations may be an extension of the earlier 
established status of particular churches." Third, the current 
or they may be distributed according to the constitution of the church, see German 
Evangelical Lutheran St. Johannes Church v. Metropolitan New York Synod of the 
Lutheran Church in America, 366 N.Y.S.2d 214 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975). The distri- 
bution plan must often be approved by a court. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. 
8 352.210(3); N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW 8 18. 
38. One state, Nevada, repealed its statute. 
39. Much of the following discussion is based on Kauper & Ellis, supra note 
1, at  1533-38. See infia notes 44-48 for the specific denominations included in each 
of these states' statutes. 
40. Kauper & Ellis, supra note 1, at 1533. 
41. Id. In 1775, nine of the 13 colonies had established churches. Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire had established the Congregational Church; 
Georgia (in 1758), Maryland (in 1702), New York's lower counties (in 1693), North 
Carolina (in 1711), South Carolina (in 1706), and Virginia (in 1609) had established 
the Anglican Church. R.L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 3-4 (1982). 
Established churches were generally known as territorial parishes, which were 
public corporations, and any person who resided within the territorial boundaries of 
the designated parish had to be a member of that parish. Carl Zollmann, Classes 
of American Religious Corporations, 13 MICH. L. REV. 566, 566-68 (1915). These 
religious establishments by the state governments were not prohibited by the feder- 
al Constitution until the application of the First Amendment religion clauses to the 
state governments through incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment in 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (Free Exercise Clause), and Everson 
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (Establishment Clause). However, established 
churches had been gradually eliminated between 1776 and 1833. The Congregation- 
al Church was disestablished in Connecticut in 1818, in New Hampshire in 1819, 
and in Massachusetts in 1833. North Carolina and New York disestablished the 
Anglican Church during the Revolutionary War, but disestablishment in Virginia 
did not occur until 1786. Disagreement exists as to when disestablishment occurred 
in Georgia, Maryland, and South Carolina, although it probably happened between 
1776 and 1789. CORD, supra, at  4. 
This explanation is partially supported by the fact that most such statutory 
schemes are found in the older states, particularly among the original colonies, 
including Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, and Vermont. Kauper & Ellis, supra note 1, at  1534. How- 
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body of statutes regarding particular denominations may repre- 
sent an unwillingness on the part of legislatures to disrupt any 
organizations that had formed under earlier statutes.42 Final- 
ly, special provisions for particular denominations may be 
viewed as necessary because general religious incorporation 
statutes may not provide a suitable mechanism for some de- 
nominations .43 
The states vary considerably in the number of denomina- 
tions included in their special statutes. Illinois, Louisiana, Min- 
nesota, and New Hampshire include only one denomination in 
their special statutory provisions for particular denomina- 
tions," while New York provides for more than thirty-five dif- 
ferent denominations." However, most states include no more 
ever, other historical factors may account for the existence of some particular de- 
nominational statutes. For example, the enactment of statutes pertaining to the 
various Eastern Orthodox churches seems to have occurred during the middle of 
the twentieth century following the spread of Communism in Central and Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union. 
42. Kauper & Ellis, supra note 1, at  1533 (noting that "any attempt to im- 
pair corporate privilege and powers under earlier statutes might be held invalid as 
an impairment of the obligation of contracts"). 
43. William J. Boyer, Jr., Property Rights of Religious Institutions in Wiscon- 
sin, 36 MAW. L. REV. 329 (1953) (explaining that the Wisconsin legislature was 
aware that "certain religious bodies could not readily comply with the uniformity 
required by the statutes concerning religious corporations without drastically alter- 
ing their government"); see also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 187.01 (West 1992). 
44. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 110150 (1993) (Eastern Orthodox Church); 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §$ 12:481-:483 (West 1994) (Orthodox Church); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. $5 315.17-.19 (West Supp. 1994) (Protestant Episcopal Church); N.H. F&v. 
STAT. ANN. 8 292:15-:17 (1987) (Orthodox Church). 
45. All the following citations refer to N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW (McKinney 
1990): art. 3 (Protestant Episcopal Parishes or Churches); art. 3A (Apostolic Episco- 
pal Parishes or Churches); art. 3B (Parishes or Churches of the Holy Orthodox 
Church in America); art. 3C (Parishes or Churches of the American Patriarchal 
Orthodox Church); art. 4 (Presbyterian Churches); art. 5 (Roman Catholic Church- 
es); art. 5A (Christian Orthodox Catholic Churches of the Eastern Confession); art. 
5B (Ruthenian Greek Catholic Churches); art. 5C (Orthodox Churches); art. 6 (Re- 
formed Dutch, Reformed Presbyterian, and Lutheran Churches); art. 7 (Baptist 
Churches); art. 8 (Congregational Christian and Independent Churches); art. 8A 
(Churches of the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches of America); art. 8B (Churches of 
the Holy Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church in Exile); art. 9 (Free Church- 
es); art. 9A (Churches of Christ, Scientist); art. 10 (other denominations, including 
$ 195 (Disciples of Christ), 201 (United Brethren in Christ), 202 (United So- 
ciety of Shakers), § 204 (Evangelical United Brethren), § 204a (Religious Society of 
Friends), 206 (Church of Christ (Disciples)), $ 207 (Jewish congregations), 5 210 
(Independent Associated Spiritualist), and 8 211 (Spiritualist Science Mother 
Church, Inc.); art. 11 (Union Churches); art. 1lA (Free Methodist Churches); art. 
13 (Spiritualist Churches); art. 14 (Churches of the Nazarene); art. 15 (Orthodox 
Greek Catholic (Eastern Orthodox) Churches); art. 16 (Spiritualist Churches Con- 
nected with the National Spiritualist Association); art. 17 (Methodist Churches); 
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than seven particular  denomination^.^^ Similarly, the states 
differ in the particular denominations included. For example, 
only two states include the Universalist Church," and only 
three states include Lutheran churches of various kinds.48 The 
four most common denominations included in the various stat- 
utes are, in order, the Protestant Episcopal Church, Methodist 
Churches, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Eastern Or- 
thodox Chur~h.~'  
3. Corporation sole 
a. Introduction. (1) General definition. The 
third and least common form of corporate structure available to 
religious organizations is the corporation sole. This corporate 
form exists in only twenty-six states and is usually available 
only to religious organizations. The corporation sole has been 
described as the practical equivalent to the modern one-person 
corporations0 in which the office is incorporated and the indi- 
vidual holding the office at  a given time has the corporate 
pri~ileges.~' Upon the death of the officeholder, the successor 
art. 18 (Churches of the Byelorussian Autocephalic Orthodox Church in America); 
art. 19 (Unitarian and Universalist Societies); and art. 20 (Assemblies of God 
Churches). 
46. See, e.g., Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 27, $8 114-118 (1989) (two de- 
nominations); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. 85 17-1711-13c, 17-1716a-16c, 17-1732-33, 
17-1753-55 (1993) (three denominations); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & 
ASS'NS $$ 5-314 to -336 (1993) (four denominations); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 67, $5 39-61 (West 1988) (four denominations); Maine, ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, $ 2982 (West 1981) (three denominations); Vermont, VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 27, $8 781-944 (1989) (seven denominations); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN. 
$8 187.01-.19 (West 1992) (six denominations). Michigan, however, includes fifteen 
denominations. MICH. STAT. ANN. g$ 21.1691-.2021 (Callaghan 1993). 
47. New York, N.Y. RELIG. COW. LAW $$ 400-414 (McKinney 1990) (Unitarian 
and Universalist Societies); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, $8 941-944 (1989) 
(Universalist Church). 
48. Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. $8 33-277 to -278, -278a to -278b 
(West 1987) (Augustana Gvangelical Lutheran Church and Lutheran Church in 
America, respectively); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. $9 16:5-1 to -27 (West 1984) 
(Evangelical Lutheran Church); New York, N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW $5 110-116 
(McKinney 1990) (Reformed Dutch, Reformed Presbyterian, and Lutheran Church- 
es). 
49. Kauper & Ellis, supm note 1, a t  1535. 
50. OLECK, supra note 4, at  20. 
51. Kauper & Ellis, supra note 1, at  1540. Blackstone defined a corporation 
sole as "one person only and his successors, in some particular station, who are 
incorporated by law, in order to give them some legal capacities and advantages, 
particularly that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons they could not have 
had." 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *469. 
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to the office becomes the corporation, thus granting perpetuity 
to the individual in his or her capacity as an officeholder. In 
the religious context, a corporation sole is the incorporation of 
the bishop or other presiding officer of the church for the pur- 
poses of administering and managing the affairs, property and 
temporalities of the The principal purpose of a cor- 
poration sole is to insure the continuation of ownership of a 
religious organization's property. At the death of the individual 
holding the office, church property passes to the successor to 
the office for the benefit of the religious group, rather than 
passing to the officeholder's heirs.53 
The corporation sole is a particularly useful organizational 
form for hierarchical religions because the organization's legal 
structure is able to mirror its internal theological structure. For 
example, in a hierarchical church, the bishop often has control 
over the church property according to the internal church polity 
and structure. By incorporating as a corporation sole, the 
bishop will also have legal authority to deal with church prop- 
erty. Because hierarchical churches are easily able to identify 
church officials with power and authority, they can easily iden- 
tify which offices to incorporate as corporations sole.54 
(2) Historical background. Under English com- 
mon law, there were two types of corporations sole: civil and 
ecclesiastical. The ecclesiastical corporation sole is the older 
form, dating to the mid-fifteenth century, while the civil corpo- 
ration sole developed 150 years later when the English mon- 
arch was deemed to be a corporation sole.55 The corporation 
sole developed as a product of early property law principles 
which did not permit the devise of real property to a church in 
fee simple absolute. A conveyance to the religious leader (usu- 
ally a parson or minister) personally thus ran the risk that the 
property might descend to the leader's heirs or be subject to 
personal debts or  encumbrance^.^^ By making the parson and 
his successors a corporation, the church accomplished the goal 
52. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE 9 10002 West 1991). 
53. See, e.g., County of San Luis Obispo v. Ashurst, 194 Cal. Rptr. 5, 6-8 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that %]he creditors of the corporation sole may not 
look to the assets of the individual holding office, nor may the creditors of the 
individual look to the assets held by the corporation sole"). 
54. Kauper & Ellis, supra note 1, at 1540. 
55. BLACKSTOM, supra note 51, at *469; Frederic W. Maitland, The Corpom- 
tion Sole, 16 L.Q. REV. 335, 337 (1900). 
56. BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at *469. 
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of preserving the property of the parsonage for the benefit of 
the church; because the present officeholder, his predecessor 
and his successor were deemed by law to be one and the same 
person, any property given to one was considered the property 
of the successor. As it developed in the New England colonies, 
the corporation sole functioned as a municipal corporation, and 
alienation of property required the consent of the parish.57 
While the earliest corporations sole came into existence as 
a product of the common law, after the Reformation in England 
a corporate charter was required for formation of a corporation 
sole.5g While the special charter system was used for corpora- 
tions sole, as for other corporations, during the nineteenth 
century, this system was gradually replaced by general corpora- 
tion statutes. In the case of the corporation sole, however, there 
was considerable antipathy to the enactment of such legisla- 
tion, because the corporation sole was viewed as hierarchical 
and anti-democratic. However, at  the urging of primarily the 
Roman Catholic Church," many states did enact either spe- 
cial legislation permitting the Church to incorporate as a corpo- 
ration sole or a general incorporation statute permitting corpo- 
rations sole?' Today, slightly more than half of the states per- 
mit some form of the corporation sole, and it is a useful organi- 
zational form for many religious groups. 
(3) States that permit the corporation 
sole. Twenty-six states permit some form of the corporation 
sole. Twelve states have explicit corporation sole statutes which 
permit religious groups to organize as a corporation sole.61 
57. Kauper & Ellis, supra note 1, at  1504-07. 
58. Earlier churches which had operated as a corporation sole before the 
charter requirement became prevalent were permitted to continue as corporations 
under the fiction of a "lost grant." Kauper & Ellis, supra note 1, at  1504. The 
Episcopal Church also enjoyed the status of a common law corporation sole in 
those states where it was established, although this status was lost as the result 
of the disestablishment process. See Terret v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 46 
(1815) (noting that the minister of a church was seized of the freehold of church 
property while he held office and was capable of transmitting that property to his 
successor in the form of a corporation sole). 
59. While opposition to the corporation sole was probably based on anti-Ro- 
man Catholic sentiment, the Roman Catholic Church favored this corporate form 
because it most closely mirrored the theological and doctrinal polity of the church 
and, in particular, it assured that church property would be controlled by the 
church hierarchy. 
60. James B. O'Hara, The Modern Corporation Sole, 93 DICK. L. REV. 23, 31 
(1988). 
61. ALA. CODE $5 10-4-1 to -9 (1987); ALASKA STAT. $4 10.40.10--150 (1989); 
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These twelve states share similar statutory patterns, although 
there is variation on specific provisions. An additional three 
states have statutes which appear to allow some form of the 
corporation sole in that they either allow a form of organization 
similar to the corporation sole but not explicitly described as a 
corporation sole, or limit the corporation sole form to certain 
 religion^.^^ Nine states have either passed special legislative 
acts granting certain religious groups (or certain bodies within 
a particular religion) the authority to incorporate as a corpora- 
tion sole or at one time had a corporation sole statute that has 
since been repealed. The case law in these states describes 
some religious organizations as corporations sole, but there is 
no current statute that allows newly organized religious groups 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. $8 10-421 to -427 (1988 & Supp. 1994); CAL. CORP. CODE 
$9 10000-10015 (West 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. $9 7-52-101 to -106 (West 1990); 
HAW. REV. STAT. 88 419-1 to -9 (1993); MONT. CODE ANN. 88 35-3-101 to -209 
(1993); NEV. REV. STAT. $8 84.010-.080 (1994); OR. REV. STAT. 8 65-067 (Supp. 
1994); UTAH CODE ANN. $8 16-7-1 to -14 (Michie 1991 & Michie Supp. 1994); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. $8 24.12.010-.040 (West 1994); WYO. STAT. 88 17-8-101 to - 
117 (1989). 
62. The North Carolina statute is the most similar to the typical corporation 
sole statute. It allows a duly appointed bishop, minister, or other ecclesiastical 
officer many of the same powers as a corporation sole, including the power to 
acquire, hold, or sell church property whenever the laws of the church permit it. 
In addition, in the event of the transfer, removal, resignation, or death of the 
officer, such property vests in the duly elected successor to the office. However, the 
statute does not specifically refer to such an office as a corporation sole. N.C. GEN. 
STAT. 8 61-5 (1989). New Hampshire appears to allow the minister of a church or 
religious society to act as a corporation sole only in reference to parsonage lands 
and with the limitation that unless the minister has the consent of the parish, no 
conveyance made by the minister is valid for longer than the minister continues to 
hold office. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. $8 306:6-:8 (1984). 
The Idaho Nonprofit Corporations Act appears to allow a form of organization 
similar in operation to a corporation sole. According to the statute, corporations 
sole created under the prior statute will be deemed single director, nonmembership 
corporations. IDAHO CODE 8 30-304 (1980). Thus, it may follow that a church or 
religious society incorporating under Idaho's current law could organize as a single 
director, nonmembership corporation which would then be very similar in operation 
to the corporation sole. Id. $8 30-308, -315, -318(e). By extension, one might further 
posit that any not-for-profit corporation organizing in Idaho might attain similar 
advantages by choosing to incorporate as a single director, nonmembership corpora- 
tion. 
Finally, the Michigan statute permits only Roman Catholic bishops and Protes- 
tant Episcopal bishops to form corporations sole. The statute grants a Roman Cath- 
olic bishop a full set of corporate powers but only grants a hotestant Episcopal 
bishop authority to deal with property. MICH. COW. LAWS ANN. $8 458.1-.2, .271- 
.273 (West 1994). 
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to incorporate as a corporation sole.63 In addition, two states 
recognize the common law corporation sole.64 
b. Functioning of a corporation sole. ( I )  T y  p i c a l 
statutory provisions. With only one ex~ept ion ,~~ all states 
that permit the formation of a corporation sole limit its use to 
religious organizations. In some cases, the statutes further 
limit the permissible purposes of a corporation sole to the man- 
agement of the property of a religious group for such objectives 
as the benefit of the religion itself, works of charity, and public 
worship.66 In general, the presiding officer of any church or 
religious society is authorized by statute to form a corporation 
sole if it is done in conformance with the rules and canons of 
the religious entity and if title to the property of the religious 
63. District of Columbia, see, e.g., Dietrich v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zon- 
ing Adjustments, 293 A.2d 470 (D.C. 1972) (Archbishop of Washington described as 
a corporation sole); Illinois, see, e.g., Fintak v. Catholic Bishop, 366 N.E.2d 480 (Ill. 
Ct. App. 1977) (Catholic Bishop of Chicago described as a corporation sole); Ken- 
tucky, see, e.g., Roland v. Catholic Archdiocese, 301 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1957) (Roman 
Catholic Bishop of Louisville described as a corporation sole); Maine, see, e.g., Par- 
ent v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 436 A.2d 888 (Me. 1981) (Roman Catholic Bishop of 
Portland described as a corporation sole); Maryland, see, e.g., Smith v. Maryland 
Casualty Co., 229 A.2d 120 (Md. 1966) (Archbishop of Baltimore described as a 
corporation sole); Massachusetts, see, e.g., Director of the Div. of Employment Sec. 
v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 420 N.E.2d 322 (Mass. 1981) (Roman Catholic bishop of 
the diocese of Springfield described as a corporation sole); New Hampshire, see, 
e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 345 A.2d 412 (N.H. 1975) (Roman Catholic Bishop of 
Manchester described as a corporation sole); New Mexico, see, e.g., Moya v. Catho- 
lic Archdiocese, 587 P.2d 425 (N.M. 1978) (Catholic Archdiocese of New Mexico de- 
scribed as a corporation sole); South Carolina, see, e.g., Decker v. Bishop of 
Charleston, 147 S.E.2d 264 (S.C. 1966) (Bishop of Charleston described as a corpo- 
ration sole created by legislative act). Although not permitting incorporation of a 
new corporation sole, the South Carolina Nonprofit Corporations Act provides for 
the amendment of the charter of a corporation sole, S.C. CODE ANN. 8 33-31-140 
(Law. Co-op. 1990). 
64. Arkansas, see, e.g., City of Little Rock v. Linn, 432 S.W.2d 455 (Ark. 
1968); Florida, see, e.g., Reid v. Barry, 112 So. 846 (Fla. 1927). 
65. Arizona permits the formation of a corporation sole for the purpose of 
acquiring, holding and disposing of the property of scientific research institutions 
maintained solely for pure research without expectation of pecuniary gain or profit. 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 8 10-421 (1993). 
66. For example, the Utah statute states: "Corporations sole may be formed 
for acquiring, holding or disposing of church or religious society property for the 
benefit of religion, for works of charity and for public worship." UTAH CODE ANN. 
8 16-7-1 (1991); see also ALASKA STAT. 5 10.40.010 (1989); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
8 10-421 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. 8 84.010 (1994); WYO. STAT. 8 17-8-109 (1989). 
Other statutes state the permissible purposes more broadly; for example, the 
Hawaii statute allows a corporation sole to organize for the purposes of "admin- 
istering and managing the affairs, property, and temporalities of the church." HAW. 
REV. STAT. $ 419-1 (1993); see also CAL. CORP. CODE 8 10002 (West 1991). 
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group is vested in that person? The process of incorpora- 
tion,B8 the powers granted by statute to the corporation 
sole," and the methods of dissol~tion~~ are usually compara- 
ble to those delineated for general not-for-profit corporations." 
Perhaps the most distinctive area of functioning for a cor- 
poration sole is the manner of providing for vacancy in and 
succession to the corporation sole office. In general, upon the 
death, resignation, or removal of the person who is the corpora- 
tion sole, the successor in office is vested with the title of all 
property held by the officer's predecessor, with the same power 
and authority over the property and subject to the same legal 
liabilities and obligations with reference to the pr~perty.'~ 
Some statutes also deal with the particular problems of interim 
vacancy in the office73 and the situation of an individual who 
67. For example, the Nevada statute provides: 
An archbishop, bishop president, trustee in trust, president of stake, pres- 
ident of congregation, overseer, presiding elder, district superintendent or 
other presiding officer or clergyman of a church or religious society or 
denomination, who has been chosen, elected or appointed in confodty  
with the constitution, canons, rites, regulations, or discipline of the church 
or religious society or denomination, and in whom is vested the legal title 
to property held for . . . the church or religious society or denomination, 
may make and subscribe written articles of incorporation . . . . 
NEV. REV. STAT. 8 84.020 (1994); see also CAI,. COW. CODE 8 10002 (West 1991) 
(speci*ng the "bishop, chief priest, presiding elder, or other presiding officer"); OR. 
REV. STAT. 8 65-067 (Supp. 1994) (specifying "any individual"). 
68. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. 8 35-3-202 (1993). A few statutes present 
variations. For example, Alaska requires the articles of incorporation to state the 
estimated value of property owned by the corporation at  the time of executing the 
articles of incorporation, ALASKA STAT. 8 10.40.040(3) (1989), and California re- 
quires a statement explaining the method for filling a vacancy in the incorporated 
office according to the rules, regulations or constitution of the religious group, CAL. 
COW. CODE 8 10003(d) (West 1991). 
69. See, e.g., ALA. CODE 8 10-4-4 (1987). The corporation sole may be explicit- 
ly exempted from any general requirement that the membership of the religious 
group must consent to property transfers. UTAH CODE ANN. 8 16-7-7 (1991). 
70. See, e.g., ALA. CODE 8 1 0 4 7  (1987); ALASKA STAT. 8 10.40.150 (1989); 
CAL. COW. CODE 8 10012-10015 (West 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. 8 419-8 (1993); 
UTAH CODE ANN. 5 16-7-12 (1991). 
71. Oregon, for example, explicitly places the corporation sole under its gener- 
al not-for-profit corporation statute, as a form of religious corporation, and subjects 
it to the same statutory treatment, differing only in that the corporation sole is 
managed by a single director without a board of directors. OR. REV. STAT. 8 65-067 
(Supp. 1994). 
72. See, e.g., ARLZ. REV. STAT. ANN. $ 10-426 (1988). 
73. The incorporated officeholder may appoint an administrator to act in case 
of temporary vacancy or, in the absence of such an administrator, the superior 
ecclesiastical authority to whom the officeholder is subject may appoint an adminis- 
trator. The administrator must file an application for a certificate of 
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was not formally incorporated as a corporation sole but who, a t  
the time of death, resignation or removal, was holding title to 
trust property for the use or benefit of a religious group.74 
(2) Judic ia l  t rea tment  of corporat ions  
sole. There seems to be relatively little case law dealing with 
particular issues involving the corporation sole. Most of the 
cases merely describe the office involved as a corporation sole 
but do not treat the corporation sole differently than other legal 
s t r u ~ t u r e s . ~ ~  Occasionally, a tendency to treat the corporation 
sole with deference does appear in judicial opinions.76 One ar- 
ea of uncertainty seems to involve the application of the princi- 
pallagency theory of liability to a corporation sole. While a cor- 
poration sole seems to bear liability on an agency theory when 
the matter involved is business-related (as would any other 
corporation), at  least one court has held that the corporation 
sole does not bear liability when the agenky issue involves an 
ecclesiastical, rather than a business, matter.?? 
administratorship with the secretary of state. See, e-g., ALA. CODE Q 10-4-6 (1987); 
COLO. REV. STAT. 8 7-52-104 (1990). On the other hand, Montana permits the su- 
perior ecclesiastical authority to appoint a board of advisors to exercise the powers 
of the corporation or to further delegate the executive and administrative functions 
of the corporation to an elected administrator. MONT. CODE ANN. Q 35-3-208 (1993). 
74. These statutes specifically provide that such property shall be deemed to 
be in abeyance until the vacancy is filled and shall then vest immediately in the 
successor without any further required act or deed so as to prevent either a rever- 
sion of the property to the donor or a vesting of the property in the heirs of the 
deceased officeholder. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. Q 10.40.120 (1989); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. Q 10-427 (1988); COLO. REV. STAT. Q 7-52-105 (1990); UTAH CODE ANN. Q 16- 
7-10 (Michie 1991); WYO. STAT. Q 17-8-117 (1989). These provisions allow religious 
groups which have not met the formal statutory requirements for incorporation as 
a corporation sole to enjoy the most important advantage of this organizational 
form in that succession to church property is thus permitted. 
75. See, e.g., Property Assocs., Inc. v. Archbishop of Guam, No. 93-00003A, 
1993 WL 470277 (D. Guam Oct. 12, 1993) (describing archbishop as corporation 
sole in dispute involving termination of a lease); St. Gregory's Church v. O'Connor, 
477 P.2d 540 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971) (Bishop of the Roman Catholic Church of the 
Diocese of Tucson described as a corporation sole in a negligence suit); Larson v. 
Archdiocese of Denver, 631 P.2d 1163 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981) (Archdiocese of Denver 
described as a corporation sole in a negligence action); Corporation of the President 
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints v. Wallace, 590 P.2d 343 (Utah 
1979) (church president described as a corporation sole in case involving issuance 
of a restraining order due to disruptive conduct of the defendant). 
76. See, e.g., Hurley v. Werly, 203 So. 2d 530, 534 (Fla. 1967) (reversing a 
lower court decision which decreed specific performance of a real estate contract 
against the Bishop of the Diocese of St. Augustine because the Bishop had failed 
to appear a t  a deposition and stating that because the corporation sole has protec- 
tive attributes, the lower court should have, "in deference to his privileged legal 
status, proceeded more cautiously than precipitately"). 
77. The Alabama Supreme Court refused to hold a corporation sole liable for 
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(3) Advantages and disadvantages. The main 
advantage of the corporation sole is the ability of the legal 
structure to mirror the doctrinal structure of a religious group 
in terms of property ownership, authority and control. This 
advantage makes the corporation sole an attractive option for 
religious groups with hierarchical polity. The corporation sole is 
also advantageous because it insures that the property of the 
religious group will pass to the successor of the corporation sole 
at  the death of the incumbent. It is viewed as a secure method 
of owning property, free of the risk of members or trustees 
using their property ownership to pressure the religious group 
on doctrinal issues. In addition, it is more secure than fee sim- 
ple ownership by the officeholder, which carries the associated 
risks that the property may pass to the officer's heirs or credi- 
tors rather than remaining with the religious group. 
On the other hand, these same advantages may also be 
considered disadvantages. While the concentration of assets 
and authority in one person may reflect a religious group's 
doctrinal structure, it may also lead to confusion between per- 
sonal and religious assets, difficulty in government monitoring, 
and lack of accountability or proper controls. The individual 
who is the corporation sole has extensive powers, and complete 
authority vests in that per~on.'~ There is a risk that unlimited 
authority by one who is not legally subject to the will of the 
membership of the religious group or other directors could lead 
to abuses. However, although the corporation sole may have 
great legal autonomy, there may be safeguards within the 
church organization to prevent abuses." The corporation sole 
the actions of a priest in damaging an  abortion clinic and found that the bishop's 
relationship with the priest was ecclesiastical in nature. The court relied on the 
fact that according to Alabama's corporation sole statute, a corporation sole's func- 
tions related to  conducting business, not to ecclesiastical duties, and thus no liabili- 
ty could be created on the part of the corporation sole unless a business activity 
were involved. Wood v. Benedictine Soc'y, 530 So. 2d 801, 805 (Ma. 1988). A Cali- 
fornia appellate court, on the other hand, held a corporation sole liable on an 
agency theory in a wrongful death action based on a car accident in which a priest 
was involved, without addressing the question of whether the underlying matter 
was ecclesiastical or business-related. The court concluded that there was agency 
liability because the bishop had the right to control the priest's activities within its 
jurisdiction and the priest was acting within the scope of the agency when the 
accident occurred. Stevens v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 123 Cal. Rptr. 171, 178 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1975). 
78. See, e.g., Estate of Zabriskie, 158 Cal. Rptr. 154, 157 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) 
(stating that "[tlhe will and judgment alone of the presiding officer regulate his 
acts, like any other individual acting in his own right"). 
79. O'Hara, supm note 60, a t  30-31 (stating that in the Roman Catholic 
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form clearly offers significant advantages to religious groups 
that find that form the most appropriate for their theological 
principles. 
D. States That Prohibit Incorporation of Religious Organiza- 
tions 
The constitutions of two states, Virginia and West Virginia, 
bar the granting of a charter of incorporation to any church or 
religious den~mination.~' The reasons for this anomalous 
treatment of religious organizations seem to lie in the strong 
historical tradition of Virginia, a tradition that dates to the 
Revolutionary period and Virginians Thomas Jefferson and 
James  adi is on.^' The theories of church-state separationism 
and religious liberty professed by Madison and Jefferson are 
reflected in Virginia's constitutional ban against the granting of 
a charter of incorporation to any church or religious denomina- 
tion. It has also been suggested that these prohibitions are the 
descendants of English mortmain statutes.82 
Church, approval of a board of consultors is now required on major property deci- 
sions). 
80. VA. CONST. art. IV, 9 14; W. VA. CONST. art. VI, 4 47. The constitution of 
South Carolina expressly prohibits special laws, but not general laws, relating to 
the incorporation of religious institutions as well as a variety of other charitable 
and not-for-profit corporations and business corporations. S.C. CODE ANN. 5 33-31- 
10 (Law. Co-op. 1990). I t  is not unusual for state constitutions to address matters 
of concern to religious groups, but these are typically restricted to provisions re- 
garding the free exercise of religion, prohibitions against aid to religious groups, 
tax exemptions to religious institutions, and protection of civil rights regardless of 
religious beliefs. Individual state constitutional provisions regarding religion are 
examined in CHESTER J. ANTIEAU ET A.. ,  RELIGION UNDER THE STATE CONSTITU- 
TIONS (1965); Kauper & Ellis, supra note 1, a t  1528; Note, Beyond the Establish- 
ment Clause: Enforcing Separation of Church and State Through State Constitution- 
a l  Provisions, 71 VA. L. REV. 625 (1985). 
81. The development of Virginia's church-state relationship began in 1609 
with the establishment of the Anglican Church (later the Episcopal Church), CORD, 
supra note 41, at  4. A disestablishment movement had begun by 1784, led by 
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, id. a t  121. In 1784, the General Assessment 
Bill was introduced into the Virginia legislature and was intended to raise funds to 
support "Teachers of the Christian Religionn through compulsory public payments. 
ROBERT S. ALLEY, THE SUPREME COURT ON CHURCH AND STATE 10 (1988); RICHARD 
E. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION 18-19 (1972). Madison's well- 
known pamphlet, "A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments," 
was authored to oppose the assessment. In the 1785 session of the General As- 
sembly, the legislature defeated the assessment bill and passed Jefferson's Bill for 
Establishing Religious Freedom, which remains in the Virginia code today. VA. 
CODE ANN. 8 57-1 (Michie 1986); see also MORGAN, supra, a t  19-24; ALLEY, supra, 
a t  12-15; GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 37, 149- 
50 (1987); CORD, supra note 41, at  4-47. 
82. See, e.g., Osnes v. Morris, 298 S.E.2d 803, 805 W. Va. 1982) ("rhe prime 
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It is also possible to conclude that the constitutional ban 
was intended to prevent the potential favoritism created by the 
granting of special corporate charters to religious organiza- 
t ion~ , '~  rather than to prevent all incorporation of religious 
organizations. In any case, the Virginia Nonstock Corporation 
Act now permits an organization to incorporate under it for any 
lawful purposeM and mentions elsewhere religious purpose 
among the permitted purposes. It appears that several organi- 
zations with religious purposes but which are not per se 
churches or other specific denominational organizations do in 
fact incorporate pursuant to these provisions. In addition, i t  
seems that denominational groups (such as individual church- 
object of mortmain acts was to repress the alarming influence of ecclesiastical 
corporations, which had, even as early as the Norman conquest, monopolized so 
much of the land in England, that the Abbot of St. Albans told the conqueror that 
the reason why he had subjugated the country by the single victory a t  Hastings 
was because the land, which was the maintenance of martial men, was given and 
converted to pious employments and for the maintenance of holy votaries".). 
83. The Virginia Constitution states, "The General Assembly shall not grant a 
charter of incorporation to any church or religious denomination . . . ." VA. CONST. 
art. 4, 8 14, para. 20. Thus, by its literal terms, the constitution only prohibits 
legislatively created religious corporations but does not seem to prohibit religious 
corporations created by some other method, as is now the case under the Virginia 
Nonstock Corporation Act, which is a general incorporation statute. See A.E. DICK 
HOWARD, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 545-46 (1974) (argu- 
ing that these provisions represent a "safeguard against an establishment of reli- 
gion, since the legislature will not be in a position, by chartering some churches 
but not others, to give preferment to any denomination or religion"). 
84. Both Virginia and West Virginia not-for-profit corporation statutes allow 
not-for-profit corporations to be organized broadly for "any lawful purpose or pur- 
poses." VA. CODE ANN. $ 13.1-825 (Michie 1994); W. VA. CODE $ 31-1-7 (1994) 
(listing examples of lawful purposes as including, but not limited, to: charitable, 
benevolent, eleemosynary, educational, civic, patriotic, social, fraternal, literary, 
cultural, athletic, scientific, agricultural, horticultural, animal husbandry, and pro- 
fessional, commercial, industrial or trade association). Although such a broad state- 
ment of permissible purpose would seem to include incorporation of churches or 
religious denominations, both states have provisions within their state constitutions 
prohibiting the incorporation of churches or religious denominations. VA. CONST. 
art. 4, 8 14, para. 20 ("[Tlhe General Assembly shall not grant a charter of incor- 
poration to any church or religious denomination, but may secure title to church 
property to an extent to be limited by law".); W. VA. CONST. $ 47 (stating, "[nlo 
charter of incorporation shall be granted to any church or religious denomination. 
Provisions may be made by general laws for securing the title to church property, 
and for the sale and transfer thereof, so that it shall be held, used, or transferred 
for the purposes of such church, or religious denomination"). In West Virginia, this 
constitutional prohibition is specifically included within the previously mentioned 
"purposes of incorporation" section of the West Virginia code. W. VA. CODE 4 31-1- 
7(c); see also Lunsford, Withrow & Co. v. Wren, 68 S.E. 308 (W. Va. 1908) (noting 
the constitutional prohibition on the granting of articles of incorporation to a 
church and a church's incompetency to sue or be sued or to enter into contracts). 
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es, synagogues, or mosques) incorporate funds for the purpose 
of holding financial assets; yet the denominational group does 
not itself in~orporate.~' Whether this is the result of a per- 
ceived constitutional ban or merely the continuation of a tradi- 
tion is difficult to determine. 
In addition to these apparent or real obstacles to incorpora- 
tion, the Virginia statutes place a limit on the amount of real 
and personal property that a religious denomination may 
85. In both Virginia and West Virginia, churches and other denominational 
groups are able to become involved in not-for-profit incorporation. For example, for 
purposes of incorporation in West Virginia, a "religious-oriented" organization will 
not be deemed a "church or religious denomination" if it will have no "ecclesiastical 
control" of persons engaged in religious worship and will not prescribe the forms of 
such worship. See Op. Att'y Gen. 252 (1957) (permitting a group whose stated 
purpose was to "win people to Christ" through evangelism and missionary work to 
incorporate because each individual was free to select the church or denomination 
of his choice). Auxiliary or para-church organizations have been incorporated with 
the purpose of maintaining or operating child care centers, retirement homes, edu- 
cation funds, fellowship funds, and preservation funds, even when such groups 
have an explicit denominational affiliation. Religious groups seem to follow the 
method of incorporating a fund for the purpose of owning property which is then 
used to support the activities of the group, but without the group itself formally 
incorporating. See, e.g., Westminster-Canterbury of Hampton Roads, Inc. v. City of 
Virginia Beach, 385 S.E.2d 561, 562 (Va. 1989) (describing corporation organized by 
the Episcopal Diocese and the Presbyterian Church to own and operate a housing 
and health-care facility as a nonstock corporation "organized exclusively for charita- 
ble, religious, educational, and scientific purposes"); St. John's Protestant Episcopal 
Church Endowment Fund, Inc. v. Vestry of St. John's Protestant Episcopal Church, 
377 S.E.2d 375, 376 (Va. 1989) (describing the fund as incorporated in order "to 
acquire and establish in perpetuity a fund . . . and to appropriate the income 
therefrom . . . to the preservation, insurance and improvements of the real and 
[personal] property [of the church] and also to its religious, charitable and benevo- 
lent uses"); St. Paul A.M.E. Church House Corp. v. Buckeye Union Ins., 379 F. 
Supp. 562, 563 (S.D.W. Va. 1974) (stating purpose of church housing corporation 
was to "build a number of low-cost public apartment house units for rental"); Ap- 
plication of Virginia United Methodist Homes, Inc., No. SEC940121, 1994 WL 
725338 (Va. Corporation Commission Nov. 18, 1994) (describing Virginia United 
Methodist Homes, Inc. as incorporated under the Nonstock Corporation Act in an 
application to be exempt from securities registration requirements); Application of 
Southeastern District-LCMS Church Extension Fund, Inc., No. SEC940035, 1994 
WL 258467 (Va. Corporation Commission Apr. 28, 1994) (describing religiously 
affiliated fund as incorporated exclusively for "religious, educational, charitable and 
benevolent purposes" under the Nonstock Corporation Act in an application for 
exemption from securities registration requirements); Application of the Christian 
Broadcasting Network, Inc., No. SEC930080, 1993 WL 359564 (Va. Corporation 
Commission Aug. 9, 1993) (describing religiously afliliated network as incorporated 
under the Nonstock Corporation Act with a "religious, educational, and charitable 
purpose" in an application for exemption from securities registration requirements). 
Op. Att'y Gen., June 23, 1969 (permitting a West Virginia Christian recreational 
center, which was nondenominational and nonsectarian, and where no specific 
church was represented, to incorporate). 
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own? Despite its origin, to whatever extent this prohibition 
is retained, it appears outdated in light of the prevailing view 
that permits incorporation of religious organizations under 
general incorporation statutes. Furthermore, limitations or 
obstacles to the ability to incorporate or to own property that 
are not generally applicable to all charitable or not-for-profit 
organizations would seem to raise serious questions of constitu- 
tionality under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend- 
ment. 
E. The Element of Choice 
The myriad of choices offered by the variations in structur- 
al forms available to religious organizations in the different 
states leads to two hrther issues. The first issue is the extent 
of flexibility offered to a religious group in choosing a structur- 
al form when the applicable state statutes seem to offer more 
than one possibility, and the extent to which this choice may 
affect other particular burdens or exemptions that will be 
granted to the religious group as a result of this choice. The 
second issue is whether a religious organization that functions 
primarily in a different state could incorporate in a state that 
permits the existence of a structural form that is particularly 
advantageous in that the legal form would more closely mirror 
the group's religious polity. Both these questions lead to the 
corollary issue, which will be addressed in the next section, of 
whether the exclusion of a legal form which best mirrors the 
theology of a particular religion is a violation of the group's 
right to free exercise of religion. 
86. Specific statutes permit religious groups to own property. VA. CODE ANN. 
$ 57-7.1 (Michie 1994); W. VA CODE $ 35-1-1 (1994). However, in Virginia, the 
trustees may not hold property for religious purposes which exceeds 15 acres of 
land in a city or town, or 250 acres outside of a city or town and within the same 
county. The local government may permit the holding of up to 50 acres within a 
town or city under certain circumstances. The trustees may not hold personal prop- 
erty which exceeds $10 million in worth. VA. CODE ANN. $ 57-12 (Michie 1994). In 
West Virginia, the statute has recently been amended to permit trustees to hold 10 
acres of land within a city, town or village and 60 acres outside of a city, town or 
village. There is no limitation placed on the amount of personal property which 
may be owned. W. VA. CODE $ 35-1-8 (1994); W.VA H.B. 2569, 72nd Legislature 
(1995). These limits are not, however, applicable only to religious groups. 
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1. Choice of structural forms within a state 
With such a great variety of statutory incorporation forms 
available, not only among the different states but even within 
the same state, it becomes necessary to consider the extent of 
choice that a religious organization has when considering the 
type of legal structure to adopt. In every state except Virginia 
and West Virginia, a religious organization would have the 
option of incorporating as a not-for-profit or nonstock corpora- 
tion. In states whose statutes make no provision for specific 
forms of religious corporations, this may also be the only 
choice. However, most states offer more than one statutory 
model, and so some of the possible variations and choices will 
now be considered. 
A few states require religious organizations to incorporate 
under the religious corporation or religious societies statute. Al- 
though these states have a not-for-profit corporation act, they 
require the special provisions pertaining to religious corpora- 
tions to govern the formation of those  corporation^.^' On the 
other hand, most states with more than one type of incorpora- 
tion statute do not specifically mention whether a religious 
organization may choose under which statute to incorporate; in 
the absence of a specific prohibition, the ability to choose would 
seem apparent.88 
Yet another variant is offered by those states that include 
among their statutory models the specific denominational stat- 
utes in addition to the more general forms of statutes. Many of 
these states permit a religious group to incorporate under 
whichever statute it ch0oses,8~ but a few states limit the 
87. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 27, 8 101 (1994); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS 
8 5-302 (1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 8 306.4 (1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. 8 55-A- 
3(A)(3) (1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 8 1702.03 (Baldwin 1995). 
88. Many of the statutes specifically mention that a religious society may 
incorporate under them. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. 88 7-20-104, 7-40-106, 7-50-101, 
7-51-101 (1995); D.C. CODE ANN. $5 29-504, -1001 (1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, 
$8 105f103.05, 110/35 (1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. $5 17-1701, 17-6001(b) (1993); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. $8 315.01, 315.05 (1995); MO. ANN. STAT. $8 355.025, 352.010 (1995); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, $8 562, 1002(A) (West 1995). A Missouri statute specifi- 
cally states that the right of a religious group to organize as it wishes is not af- 
fected by the statute. MO. ANN. STAT. 8 355.500 (1995). 
89. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 67, $8 23, 40, 44 West 1995) (per- 
mitting a religious group to incorporate under the religious society provisions or 
under the denominational statutes for Methodist, Episcopal, and Roman Catholic 
churches); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 88 450.159, 450.178, 450.3302, 458.262, 458.428 
(West 1995) (allowing a choice to religious groups whether to incorporate under 
trustee corporation provisions, ecclesiastical corporation provisions, not-for-profit 
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choices available to particular denominations." Those statutes 
that limit the choices available to specific religious groups, 
particularly when a group is required to incorporate under a 
particular denominational provision would probably not be 
viewed by adherents of that denomination as an infringement 
on their freedom of religious choice. By the same token, howev- 
er, the existence of the denominational statutes is presumably 
the product of a lobbying effort by the denomination itself and 
may thus raise the question of a preference granted to particu- 
lar religious groups. It is apparent that those states that do not 
have denominational provisions or that limit such provisions to 
a select group of denominations are implicitly limiting the 
choices of those groups that do not have the benefit of such 
provisions. Furthermore, the limited presence of the corpora- 
tion sole as a structural choice raises questions of limitations 
on a religious group's ability to choose, particularly when that 
form is best-suited to a group's religious polity. 
2. Foreign corporations 
It is also necessary to consider the obverse of the question 
of the element of choice, which involves the ability of a reli- 
gious group that has been formed in one state to function in a 
different state. Following the model of the business corporation 
statutes, many states provide in their general not-for-profit 
corporation statute or religious corporation statute for the oper- 
ation of foreign corporations within that state.g1 The issue 
corporation provisions, or specific denominational statutes); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
$8 15A.2-l(b); 16:2-12, 16:5-1, 16~3-1, 16:lOA-2, 16:ll-1, 16~12-1, 16~13-1, 16:lOA-2, 
16:ll-1, 16:12-1, 16:13-1, 16:15-1, 16:16-1, 16:17-3 (West 1995) (allowing religious 
groups to incorporate as either a not-for-profit corporation or under one of 10 spe- 
cific denominational statutes); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 901, 2861, 3021, 
2982, 2986 (West 1994) (granting a choice to religious groups). 
90. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 58 33-264a, 33-500, 33-268, 33-279 (West 
1995) (generally permitting a choice whether to organize under the Religious Cor- 
poration and Societies provision, the specially chartered corporations provision, or 
the specific denominational provisions, but prohibiting formation as a nonstock 
corporation); WE. STAT. ANN. 48 181.03, 187.01, 187.12, 181.76(3) (West 1995) (gen- 
erally permitting a choice whether to incorporate as a nonstock corporation or 
under religious societies statutes but excluding Roman Catholic churches from the 
religious society provisions). 
91. Most states seem to permit foreign not-for-profit corporations to perform 
the same activities as domestic corporations. In some cases, the foreign corporation 
may be required to register or obtain a certificate from the secretary of state, see, 
e.g., WASH. REV. CODE 6 24.03.305 (1995), while in other states there are no re- 
quirements, see, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 181.66 (1995). Most statutes limit the foreign 
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that this poses is whether a religious organization that desires 
to operate in one state, the statutes of which do not expressly 
provide for the structural model that the organization prefers, 
could incorporate in a different state that does offer the pre- 
ferred structure. In an analogy to the Delaware business corpo- 
ration, a particular religious organization could incorporate in a 
state that provides for a particular corporate form, such as a 
denominational form or corporation sole, and then operate and 
conduct business in a state that does not specifically permit the 
incorporation of this type of corporation. While there seems to 
be virtually no case law on this subject, the statutes of many 
states would seem to permit this arrangement. Whether this 
would create collateral issues or complications, such as in the 
ownership of property by a foreign entity, is not clear in the 
current state of the law. 
The one caveat to such an arrangement, however, is that 
religious organizations need to consider a variety of issues in 
addition to the availability of particular corporate structures. 
For example, some states grant exemptions from certain regu- 
lations to religious corporations. Perhaps the most common 
example is the exemption from registration requirements im- 
posed on other types of not-for-profit  corporation^.^^ A more 
interesting question arises in those states that exempt volun- 
teer directors and officers of not-for-profit corporations from 
liability for simple negligen~e.'~ Such protection would today 
be considered highly desirable and would thus provide a consid- 
erable incentive to incorporate in such a state. 
corporation to acting in ways permitted to similar domestic corporations, and some 
specifically state that "nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to reg- 
ulate the organization or the internal affairs of a foreign corporation." Id. 
5 181.66(1). It would seem to be possible for a particular corporation to organize in 
a state which permits corporations sole and then to conduct activities in a state 
which does not but which has such a specific provision. 
92. While the considerable majority of states that impose particular require- 
ments under Solicitation Acts exempt religious organizations fiom those re- 
quirements, four states do not. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17510-17510.7 (West 1990); 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. $9 51:1901-1907 (West 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 
$8 5001-5016 (West 1980 & Supp. 1994); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, 5 162.3 (1994) 
(exempting religious institutions which comply with I.R.C. O 501(c)(3) and which 
are supported primarily by government grants and funds solicited fiom their own 
membership). A state's ability to regulate solicitation would be restricted to its own 
jurisdiction but would subject foreign corporations to the same requirements as 
domestic corporations. 
93. See, e.g., ILL. h 4 N .  STAT. ch. 805 5 1051108.70 (1995) (exempting uncom- 
pensated officers and directors from liability except for willful and wanton conduct). 
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111. ??HE RELATIONSHIP OF INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE TO THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 
This discussion of legal structures available to religious 
organizations leads to the crux of the dilemma that must be 
confronted-the relationship between legal structure and the 
religion clauses of the First A~nendment.'~ While it is not nec- 
essary for a religious organization to adopt formally any legal 
structure in order to carry out its religious mission or even to 
attain favorable tax status, if the religious organization wishes 
to attain various other advantages, then it must squeeze itself 
into the mold of one of the legal forms that a particular state 
chooses to make available, regardless of how well or how poorly 
the particular mold may fit the theology of the particular reli- 
gion. Many religious organizations now take those advantages 
for granted; in fact, they often regard them as necessary to the 
carrying out of their religious mission. As a result, the question 
of the extent to which the available forms fit the theology of a 
particular religious group directly implicates the concerns of 
the Free Exercise Clause. 
On the other hand, those who work (both as practitioners 
and as legal theoreticians) in the field of not-for-profit and 
charitable organizations question whether the creation of spe- 
cial exemptions for religious groups, in their organizational 
form, violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amend- 
ment. In sum, the question posed is whether religious organiza- 
tions, as institutions rather than as aggregates of individuals, 
should be held accountable to both government and society as a 
whole by the same standards as other charitable organizations 
or whether they should be largely exempt from such account- 
ability because of the First Amendment. 
The question of accountability and responsibility of reli- 
gious organizations under the law is a complex and intriguing 
one that illustrates well the conflict between an individual- 
oriented and an institution-oriented constitutional jurispru- 
dence of civil liberties. The extent to which laws can require or 
94. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
Establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. 
amend. I. The Supreme Court has generally treated this provision as embodying 
two distinct clauses and two distinct values pertaining to the status of religion and 
its relationship to the government. However, their interpretation and interconnee 
tedness are complex and produce little agreement. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon & 
Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1991). 
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prohibit conduct that contradicts religious mandate is central 
to the questions of the relationship among religious institu- 
tions, individuals, society and government and brings out a 
fundamental conflict between two deeply rooted values-the 
desire to protect freedom of religion and the desire to hold all 
equally accountable under the law. 
The requirement to submit to governmental regulation has 
always applied in the United States to conduct and not at  all to 
religious belief, the latter being entirely exempt from govern- 
mental interference." Individuals and religious organizations 
are, however, at  least to some extent accountable to society for 
their conduct and activities under governmental reg~lation.'~ 
The proponents for an expansive approach to religious free 
exercise have asserted the need for a "constitutionally com- 
pelled" or a "judicially created" exemption from such regulation 
when the regulation unduly burdens the fkee exercise of reli- 
g i ~ n . ' ~  Throughout modern constitutional jurisprudence until 
1990, the boundaries of such accountability were determined by 
requiring a compelling state interest to justie the burden im- 
posed on the free exercise of religion.98 Through the applica- 
95. The freedom of belief, whether grounded in what would be generally rec- 
ognized as a religious belief or in a more secular conscientious belief, has been 
given absolute protection under both the Free Exercise Clause and the Free Speech 
Clause. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 231 (1963) (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
96. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); Cantwell v. Con- 
necticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940); Intercommunity Ctr. for Justice and Peace v. 
INS, 910 F.2d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 1990) ("These clauses have been interpreted as pro- 
viding full protection for religious beliefs but only limited protection for overt acts 
prompted by those beliefs."). For criticisms of this belieuaction dichotomy in First 
Amendment jurisprudence, see, e.g., Shelley K. Wessels, Note, The Collision of Reli- 
gious Exercise and Governmental Nondiscrimination Policies, 41 STAN. L. REV. 
1201, 1207-08 (1989). 
97. The argument for such an exemption is essentially that the attempt to 
impose governmental regulation in conflict with religious mandate creates a viola- 
tion of the rights guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause. For a strong presenta- 
tion in support of a broad interpretation of accommodation and exemptions for 
religious interests, see Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Up- 
date and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685 (1992). 
98. The extent of this accountability was premised on a three-part test which 
evaluated: 1) the extent of the governmental interference with sincerely held reli- 
gious belief, 2) the existence of a compelling state interest to justify the burden 
imposed on the free exercise of religion, and 3) the extent to which an exemption 
from the regulation would impede the objectives which the government sought to 
advance through the regulation. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). This formulation is substantially 
similar to the "compelling government interest" test used to evaluate the legitimacy 
of governmental interference with other fimdamental freedoms, particularly freedom 
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tion of this test, the Supreme Court has produced an arguably 
bewildering patchwork of permissible and impermissible forms 
of governmental regulation.'' 
It was this inconsistent patchwork that led the Supreme 
Court in 1990, under the leadership of Justice Scalia, to change 
fundamentally the evaluation of claims to exemption from gov- 
ernmental regulation based on the right to religious free exer- 
cise. In 1990, in Employment Division, Department of Human 
Resources v. Smith,'@' the Supreme Court disclaimed the ap- 
plicability of the compelling government interest test for eval- 
uating laws that make no distinctions based on religion. Ac- 
cording to Smith, facially neutral governmental regulation 
which nonetheless had a disproportionate impact on particular 
religious practices would be evaluated under the lowest level of 
judicial scrutiny, which requires only that the government have 
a legitimate interest in the regulation and that the regulation 
be rationally related to that interest. Because it is rare for a 
regulation to target only particular religious practices,lO' the 
of speech. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992); Sable Communica- 
tions v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). 
99. For example, parents could direct their children's education, see Wisconsin 
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (mandating exemption for members of Old Order 
Amish religious groups from state statute requiring school attendance until age 16), 
and individuals could not be denied unemployment compensation when their jobs 
required them to work on their religiously mandated day of rest or employment 
demands conflicted in other ways with their religious beliefs, see Hobbie v. Unem- 
ployment Appeals Comm., 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (denial of unemployment benefits 
because of refusal to work on Sabbath); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employ- 
ment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (denial of unemployment benefits to applicant 
whose religion forbade manufacture of weapons); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 
(1963) (denial of unemployment benefits because of refusal to work on Sabbath). 
On the other hand, individuals could be required to comply with various govern- 
ment regulations, including social security laws, see Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 
(1986) (federal statute requiring states to use social security numbers in adminin- 
tering welfare programs did not violate Native Americans' religious rights); they 
could be required to keep their businesses closed on a state-mandated day of rest, 
see Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super 
Mkt., Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961); and the government could construct a road and 
permit timber-harvesting in a sacred area, see Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
100. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Arguably, the Supreme Court had already abandoned 
the compelling government interest test in, for example, Lyng, 485 U.S. 439, and 
Bowen, 476 U.S. 693. 
101. In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (19931, 
the Supreme Court held that an ordinance which prohibited the killing of animals 
only in connection with sacrifice and ritual purposes was unconstitutional because 
it was motivated by anti-religious animus and thus violated the Free Exercise 
Clause. 
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impact of Smith seemed to be the virtually total elimination of 
the constitutionally-compelled exemption of individuals from 
otherwise valid, generally applicable governmental regulation. 
The application of Smith had thus seemed to usher in a new 
era of accountability for religious organizations in that they 
would be shielded from such regulation only when it was moti- 
vated by an animus against particular religious practices or 
when it creates a denominational preference. 
Although Congress acted in the fall of 1993 to reverse all 
or most of the effects of the Smith decision by enacting the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (or RFRA),lo2 the shifts in 
religion clause jurisprudence prompted by the Smith decision 
should be evaluated as background against which to predict the 
next stages of development in religion clause jurisprudence. 
During the period between Smith and RFRA, lower courts 
began the development of a new method of analyzing claims to 
exemption from governmental regulation and other forms of 
intrusion upon spheres of religious activity. How this method of 
analysis is integrated with RFRA will determine the next stage 
of religion clause jurisprudence. 
The aftermath of Smith caused a significant analytical 
shift in religion clause jurisprudence.lo3 This shift involved 
the use of the Establishment Clause to invalidate governmental 
regulation when it conflicted with religious beliefs, because the 
Free Exercise Clause had been virtually eliminated as an ave- 
nue of relief. Hi~torically,'~~ the Establishment Clause was 
102. 42 U.S.C. 5 2000bb-1 (1995). RF'RA restored the strict scrutiny, or compel- 
ling government interest, test to all regulations and government actions which sub- 
stantially burden a person's exercise of religion. For a fuller consideration of RFRA, 
see infra notes 115-121 and accompanying text. 
103. In addition to the effects of Smith on religion clause jurisprudence within 
the United States, Smith had also raised some question about the status of free- 
dom of religion in the United States under international law. 
104. The Establishment Clause was, in fact, originally intended to prevent the 
federal government from interfering with the state religious establishments which 
existed at the end of the eighteenth and into the first half of the nineteenth centu- 
ries. See Kauper & Ellis, supra note 1, at 1557-64. Thus, unlike many of the other 
rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, the Establishment Clause was not intended 
to give general protection to individuals or even religious institutions, but rather to 
protect state-government sponsored religious activity from interference by the feder- 
al government. The process of incorporation of the Establishment Clause, which oc- 
curred in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), and which applied this 
restriction to the state governments, thus required a bigger leap than the incor- 
poration of the other fundamental freedoms and, although generally accepted today, 
is considerably more controversial from a historical perspective. See School Dist. of 
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 25458 (1963) (Breman, J., concur- 
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used primarily to evaluate situations in which the government 
may create an endorsement or support of a particular religious 
viewpoint, as in the cases of public religious symbols,'" 
prayer in public schools, and other forms of government-spon- 
sored prayer,lo6 or to confer a benefit on religious institu- 
tions, such as public aid to parochial schools.'07 
However, during the period afier Smith and before RFRA, 
the excessive entanglement prong of the Supreme Court's test 
for evaluating government activity under the Establishment 
Clauselo8 became the primary vehicle for challenges to gov- 
ring); Glendon & Yanes, supra note 94, at  480-92 (criticizing incorporation of the 
Establishment Clause and the reasoning in Everson). 
105. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); County of Allegheny v. 
American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
106. The subject of religious activity in public schools has been considered by 
the Supreme Court in several cases. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) 
(prohibiting state-sponsored "nondenomination" prayer at  public school graduation); 
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (striking down statute mandating bal- 
anced treatment for evolution science and creation science); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 
U.S. 38 (1985) (permitting silent prayer or meditation in schools); Stone v. Gra- 
ham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (holding that requiring the posting of Ten Commandments 
in classrooms violated the Establishment Clause); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 
97 (1968) (striking down statute which prohibited teaching of evolution in public 
schools); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding that state-sponsored 
daily prayer, even if denominationally neutral and voluntary, violated the Estab- 
lishment Clause because such prayer served to advance religion); Engel v. Vitale, 
370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
107. The Court has considered various forms of government aid to parochial 
schools. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (striking down federal funding 
for salaries of public school employees assigned to provide remedial services to low- 
income children in parochial schools); School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) 
(holding that public funding of full-time parochial schoolteachers to teach secular 
subjects is unconstitutional); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (salary sup- 
plements for parochial school teachers); see also Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School 
Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993) (permitting reimbursement for expenses for deaf child 
attending parochial school); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (upholding 
federal grants program to public and private social service agencies, including reli- 
gious agencies); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding a Minnesota tax 
deduction for parochial school expenses); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 
(1947) (upholding publicly funded transportation to parochial school). The requiring 
of equal access to public school and university facilities for religious organizations 
has been approved in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 
113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993), reversed on remand, 17 F.3d 1425 (1994); Board of Educ. of 
Westwide Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); and Widmar v. 
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). In its most recent decision evaluating government 
activity under the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court held that the creation 
of a school district for the exclusive purpose of providing special education to the 
children of a Satmar Hasidic community insulated from the surrounding non-Hasid- 
ic communities was unconstitutional. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. 
Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994). 
108. The Supreme Court enunciated a three-part test in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
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ernmental regulation of religious organizations. Although not 
part of a free exercise analysis, the test for excessive entangle- 
ment was used to strike down governmental regulation that 
would otherwise have been permissible under the Smith test. 
Thus, what was intended as a method to evaluate the granting 
of a governmental benefit to religious organizations became the 
test for evaluating the imposition of burdens on religious activi- 
ty,'Og even though it does not address the question of account- 
ability and responsibility under societal norms, as expressed in 
legislative enactments. 
The use of the excessive entanglement test to resolve what 
were in fact free exercise claims resulted in two further chang- 
es in judicial analysis of such issues. The first of these was that 
only institutions, and no longer individuals, were able to obtain 
exemptions from government regulation. Excessive entangle- 
ment analysis emphasizes almost exclusively the relationship 
between government and religious institutions, not the relation- 
ship between government and individuals who are carrying out 
their religious dictates.'" The result of the dichotomy of pro- 
403 US. 602 (1971), to determine when a government action constitutes an im- 
permissible "establishment" of religion: 1) whether the statute or other government 
action has a secular purpose, 2) whether its principal or primary effect neither 
advances nor inhibits religion, and 3) whether the government action creates an 
excessive entanglement between government and religion. Id. at  612-13. Although 
the viability of the Lemon test has been hotly debated, it was specifically reaf- 
firmed in Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). The test for excessive entangle- 
ment has itself been split into three factors: 1) the character and purpose of the 
institution involved, 2) the nature of the regulation's intrusion into religious affairs, 
and 3) the resulting relationship between the government and the religious authori- 
ty. 
109. For discussions of the use of excessive entanglement to gain exemption 
6.om government regulation before the Smith decision, see Ira Lupu, Free Exercise 
Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 
B.U. L. REV. 391, 409-11 (1987), and William P. Marshall & Douglas C. Blomgren, 
Regulating Religious Organizations Under the Establishment Clause, 47 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 293 (1986). 
110. Even before enactment of RFRA, some commentators had suggested that 
the right of religious free exercise belongs only to individuals and not to institu- 
tions at  all. See, e.g., Lupu, supra note 109, at 419-31; School Dist. v. Schempp, 
374 US. 203, 223 (1963) (characterizing the purpose of the Free Exercise Clause 
as "to secure religious liberty in the individual"). For criticism of this view, see 
Glendon & Yanes, supra note 94, at  495-96. The idea that the Free Exercise 
Clause protects only individuals and not institutions makes an appealing basis for 
arguments in favor of increased accountability of religious organizations because i t  
eliminates a category of free exercise challenges to governmental regulation. How- 
ever, it is diflicult to ignore that at  times individuals who belong to a group may 
only be able to fulfill their religious dictates through an organizational structure. 
Nonetheless, this is not a reason to grant free exercise rights exclusively to reli- 
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tection to be granted to individuals and institutions under 
Smith is the opposite of what it should be-institutions are 
granted free exercise rights, although presented in the guise of 
an excessive entanglement challenge, while individuals are 
largely denied any right to free exercise based on religious 
beliefs. 
The second corollary was the reversal of another dichotomy 
inherent in evaluating the fundamental freedoms contained in 
the Bill of Rights. The protections granted to these fundamen- 
tal freedoms are generally phrased as negative rights."' 
Thus, the government, primarily through the legislature, can- 
not interfere with these rights, but it has no affirmative obliga- 
tion to provide or protect these rights. The judiciary, through 
its interpretation of the Constitution, can strike down legis- 
lative enactments that interfere with these rights. The legisla- 
ture and, to a large extent, the executive branches are reposito- 
ries of majoritarian power, and their actions generally reflect 
the will of the majority. The judiciary represents a counter- 
majoritarian factor and provides the only protection for the 
minority's right to these fundamental freedoms.'12 
In his Smith decision, Justice Scalia largely eliminated the 
courts as protectors of these minoritarian rights but reiterated 
that the legislature is still free to create legislative exemptions 
from such regulation for specific religious practices.'" Thus, 
religious groups with large numbers of adherents or with great- 
er amounts of political influence would be able to win proteo 
tion of their free exercise rights through legislatively-created 
exemptions. On the other hand, smaller groups and individuals 
who do not possess equivalent political power would be largely 
gious organizations while effectively denying them on an individual, minoritarian 
basis, as seems to be the dictate of the Smith decision. This tension between the 
rights of individuals and the rights of institutions becomes even more significant 
when viewed against the earlier discussion of institutional structures available to 
religious groups and the concomitant rights and responsibilities which these struc- 
tures impose upon the religious group. 
111. The concept of the "negative" Constitution is more typically used to de- 
scribe the fact that, with a few exceptions, the government is required only to 
refrain from interfering with individuals and not to provide specific benefits or 
protections. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 
MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2273-78 (1990). 
112. See Charles M. Freeland, The Political Process as Final Solution, 68 IND. 
L.J. 525, 526-27 (1993). 
113. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. For a critique of reliance on a majoritarian demo- 
cratic political process to protect fundamental rights, particularly in the context of 
Smith, see Freeland, supra note 112, at  560-62. 
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unable to achieve either legislatively-created or judicially-creat- 
ed exemptions. 
The effects of these analytical shifts may be demonstrated 
by some lower court decisions between 1990 and 1993. In ac- 
cord with the dictates of Smith, these courts refused to enter- 
tain free exercise challenges to the imposition of facially neu- 
tral government regulations. For example, in Black v. Snyder, a 
1991 Minnesota appellate decision, the court rejected a church's 
claim to be exempted under the Free Exercise Clause from the 
state's human rights statute when the associate pastor brought 
claims of employment discrimination, defamation, breach of 
contract, and retaliatory discharge against her church and the 
senior pastor.ll4 The court dismissed her claims against the 
church based on the entanglement prong of the Establishment 
Clause but allowed her suit based on sexual harassment 
against the senior pastor to continue, explaining that the suit 
against the pastor was allowed because it related to conduct 
during the employment relationship rather than to the 
plaintiffs pastoral qualifications or church doctrine. The 
church was thus protected, while the pastor was not. Thus, 
although not part of a free exercise analysis, the excessive 
entanglement question could be used to strike down govern- 
mental regulation that was otherwise considered permissible 
under the Smith formulation of free exercise analysis. 
In the fall of 1993, Congress enacted RFRA with the explic- 
it purpose of reversing the effects of the Smith decision, provid- 
ing that the 
Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise 
of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability . . . [unless the government] demonstrates that 
application of the burden to the person-41) is in furtherance 
of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least 
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 
interest. '15 
114. Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 719 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). In NLRB v. 
Hanna Boys Center, 940 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2965 
(1992), the Ninth Circuit relied in part on Smith in denying a religiously affiliated 
youth center's claim to be exempt from NLRB jurisdiction under the Free Exercise 
Clause. 
115. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 14888 
(1993) (codified at 5 U.S.C. 5 504; 42 U.S.C. 58 1988, 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1993)). 
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These provisions clearly represent an attempt to return to the 
judicial standards utilized to evaluate free exercise claims be- 
fore the Smith decision. However, the statute's provisions con- 
cerning "substantial" burdens and, even more significantly, its 
apparent emphasis on the burdens placed on the individual's 
free exercise of religion remain to be evaluated. Of even greater 
interest is the future of RFRA itself. Although several courts 
have decided matters under RFFtA,ll6 several commentators 
have questioned its viability,"' and one District court 
116. RFRA has been considered in approximately 65 federal cases, most of 
which implicitly regard it as constitutional or did not consider the question of 
constitutionality necessary to decide the case. See, e.g., Canedy v. Boardman, 16 
F.3d 183, 186 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that RFRA raised questions of constitu- 
tionality concerning Congress' powers under 5 5 of the 14th Amendment but that i t  
was not necessary to decide this issue); Cheema v. Thompson, 1994 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 24160, *8-*10 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding Free Exercise Clause violation be- 
cause school district had failed to use least restrictive means of accomplishing 
school safety as required by RFRA); Rust v. Clarke, 1995 U.S. Dist LEXIS 5584, 
*31 n.12 (April 26, 1995) (noting that neither party questioned the constitutionality 
of RFRA); Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 862 F. 
Supp. 538; 849 F. Supp. 77 (D.D.C. 1994) (assuming constitutionality of RFRA). 
117. Enactment of RFRA has spawned considerable commentary, much of i t  
presenting general guidelines to RFRA's interpretation and significance. See, e.g., 
Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretative Guide to the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 39 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1994); Douglas Laycock, 
RFRA, Congress and the Ratchet, 56 MONT. L. REV. 145, 152-69 (1995) (concluding 
that Congress does have authority under 5 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
enact RFRA); Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 895-97 (1994) (discussing RFRA generally); Douglas 
Laycock & Oliver Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 
TEX. L. REV. 209, 253-54 (1994) (discussing lack of clarity in level of judicial scru- 
tiny utilized before Smith). 
Several commentators have also questioned the constitutionality and wisdom of 
RFRA. See, e.g., Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restomtion Act: The 
Constitutional Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MONT. L. REV. 39, 60- 
79 (1995) (concluding that RFRA is unconstitutional as applied to state and local 
laws because Congress exceeded its authority under 5 5 of the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Mediating Institutions: Be- 
yond the PubliclPrivate Distinction: The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitu- 
tional Basis for Protecting Religious conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1306-11 
(1994) (questioning whether Congress can direct the Supreme Court how to inter- 
pret the Constitution); Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, Why the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 443- 
45 (1994) (considering RFRA unconstitutional because i t  conflicts with principles of 
religious freedom, Congress overstepped its authority under 3 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in attempting to regulate state law, and RFRA violates separation of 
powers); Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox 
into the Henhouse under Cover of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 
CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 363-69 (1994) (concluding that in enacting RFRA, Congress 
exceeded its constitutional powers); Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Resto- 
ration Act: Pushing the Limits of Legislative Power, 73 TEX L. REV. 247, 284-307 
478 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995 
has recently declared it to be uncon~titutional.~'~ 
The preceding discussion of the various associational struc- 
tures available to religious organizations and the results of the 
DePaul University Center for ChurchIState Studies Survey of 
Religious Organizations demonstrate that religious organiza- 
tions choose amongst available legal structures in order to gain 
certain advantages. One could therefore posit that if a religious 
organization chooses these advantages and thus acts more like 
other foms of not-for-profit organizations, a different analysis 
should be required for those burdens that fall more heavily on 
the religious organization in its institutional form than on 
individuals. 
For example, one might wish to set up a continuum of 
types of governmental regulations determined by their relative 
impact directly on individuals and their relative impact directly 
on religious institutions. While not all types of regulations 
would be easily classified, a few examples might demonstrate 
the application of such a continuum. At one end of the continu- 
um, one could examine some types of landmark and historic 
preservation ordinances that arguably burden only institutions 
(most typically the corporate or associational owners of the 
buildings) and not individuals, except in their roles as members 
of the  institution^."^ Such ordinances would therefore not be 
(1994) (questioning whether RFRA violates the Establishment Clause and whether 
Congress exceeded its powers under 8 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Ira Lupu, 
The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230, 273-75 (1994) 
(pointing out possible constitutional difficulties with RFRA); Ira Lupu, Statutes Re- 
volving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. REV. 1, 56-59 (1993) (discussing 
Congress' power to enact RFRA under the Commerce Clause and $ 5 of the Four- 
teenth Amendment); William P. Marshall, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: 
Establishment, Equal Protection and Free Speech Concerns, 56 MONT. L. REV. 227 
(1995) (questioning the constitutionality of RFRA under the Establishment Clause, 
Free Speech Clause and Equal Protection Clause and suggesting that RFRA be 
interpreted to apply only to claims brought by religious institutions and not to 
claims brought by individuals); James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1407 (1992) 
(questioning whether RFRA will succeed in expanding upon religious liberty). 
118. Flores v. City of Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (holding 
RFRA unconstitutional because it violated separation of powers). But see Hamilton 
v. Schriro, 863 F. Supp. 1019 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (holding RFRA to be constitutional). 
119. See, e.g., Rector, Wardens and Members of the Vestry of St. 
Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 353-56 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(holding that application of Landmark Law to prevent a church from building an 
office tower did not violate the Free Exercise Clause because it does not hinder the 
church's religious and charitable mission). For examples in the labor context, see 
Tony and Susan Alarno Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) 
(application of Fair Labor Standards Act to religious organization); King's Garden, 
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subject to the compelling government interest test established 
in RFRA, but rather to a lower level of scrutiny. 
At the other extreme end of the continuum would fall reli- 
gious practices that are undertaken largely by individuals sepa- 
rated from the institutional structure adopted by a religious 
group. The best example here is the factual basis of Smith, in 
which the smoking of peyote, although sometimes engaged in 
within a group context, bears no relation to the formal struc- 
ture or corporate aspects of the religious A middle 
ground, and perhaps the thorniest issue, is represented by 
controversies involving the application of anti-discrimination 
laws to religious organizations and, in particular, to clergy.121 
In these situations, although the actor seems to be an institu- 
tion or corporation, the institution may in fact be acting merely 
as an aggregate of individuals rather than exclusively in its 
institutional capacity. 
This summary of the current law in the United States 
concludes with a few obsemations and suggestions for future 
thought. First, the limited availability of structural forms for 
religious groups with different theological polities may place an 
undue or excessive burden on the free exercise of religion, 
which falls unevenly on religions with different polities. This 
inequality should prompt states to make available a wider 
array of structural forms and, in particular, to permit religious 
organizations to adopt the corporation sole form when they so 
wish. 
An expansion of available structural forms, however, leads 
to the second question of whether religious organizations 
should be held to the same standards of accountability as other 
Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (application of FCC rules to religious 
organization). 
120. One might also note the decision in Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks 
Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571, 572-73 (Mass. 1990), which, although involving a land- 
mark ordinance, directly affected the method of worship because the ordinance 
applied to the internal arrangement of furniture within the church. 
121. See, e.g., McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560-61 (5th Cir. 
1972), cert. denied, 409 US. 896 (1972); EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological 
Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 282-83 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982); 
Assemany v. Archdiocese of Detroit, 434 N.W.2d 233 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Alicea 
v. New Brunswick Theological Seminary, 608 k 2 d  218 (N.J. 1992); Scharon v. St. 
Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360, 362-63 (8th Cir. 1991); Rayburn 
v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168-71 (4th Cir. 
1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986); Young v. Northern Ill. Conference of 
United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 1994 U.S. 
LEXIS 7124 (1994). 
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types of charitable, not-for-profit organizations. While they 
clearly should not and cannot be subjected to more regulations, 
are there circumstances, particularly those which involve com- 
pelling or significant government interests, such as protection 
of children and eradication of employment discrimination, in 
which religious organizations should be held to the same stan- 
dard as other charitable and not-for-profit organizations. Such 
a standard of accountability based on equality norms should, in 
turn, be tempered by considerations of whether the burden of 
government regulation falls primarily on individuals or on 
institutions. Thus, in evaluating the burdens imposed on reli- 
gious organizations as part of a free exercise analysis, a differ- 
ent standard or level of scrutiny should be utilized depending 
on whether the burdens seem to fall more on the institutional 
than on the individual aspects of religious free exercise. 
